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ABSTRACT 
The present paper was an exploratory attempt at examining 
changing definitional conceptions of courage. Traditional conceptions 
were found to abound in popular definitions and confusion with respect 
to both the meaning and origin of courage. Unconscious conformity to 
societal norms, symbolic attachment to national roles, a learning theory 
analogue and the broad conception of S-R (stimulus-response) behaviour 
were examined as possible explanatory frameworks. An analysis of cour-
age and survival clarified the relationship between courage and hope. 
An interdependent rather than independent relationship between the two 
concepts was postulated. The S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) model 
was employed as a general explanatory framework for contemporary concep-
tions of courage. The moral courage of traditional models and the self-
reliance found in survival situations were combined into a more compre-
hensive "personal involvement". Contemporary courage was defined further 
within the framework of a new culture and a freely chosen active adher-
ence to its changing values, attitudes and belief systems. Cognitive 
and interactive risk taking hypotheses, attitude change studies and 
social and political activism studies provided indirect empirical sup-
port for the postulated definitional components of contemporary courage. 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
List of Tables iv 
List of Figures v 
INTRODUCTION 1 
I HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 7 
Courage and War 7 
Religious Courage 25 
The Physical Courage of Sportsmen 28 
Pioneer Contributions of Psychologists 32 
Summary Explanations: Philosophical 40 
Psychological 42 
A Basic Explanatory Model 47 
Contemporary Illustrations 
of the Traditional Model 48 
II COURAGE AND SURVIVAL 50 
Courage and Hope 59 
Alternative Explanations of Coping in 
Survival Situations 63 
A Learning Theory Explanation 69 
III CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF COURAGE 75 
A Basic Explanatory Model 77 
Cultural Change: The "stimulus" for 
Personal Involvement 79 
Contemporary Courage and Personal 
Involvement: Cognitive 83 
Affective: Commitment 98 
Attitude 104 
Personality Correlates HO 
IV ACTION CONSISTENT WITH BELIEFS 117 
CONCLUSIONS 131 
REFERENCES 134 
iii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
1. Percentage Of Students Who Agree Or Mostly 
Agree With Items In Pacifism Scale 107 
2. Clergy Participation In The Vietnam Issue 
According To Position On The War 120 
3. Perceived Necessity Scores Of Activists For 
Selected Components Of National Role 124 
4. Protestors' Scores On Functional-
Internal Scale Items 125 
5. Protestors' Scores On Opposition To 
War Scales 126 
Iv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
1. Schematic Representation of Traditional 
Conceptions of Courage 6 
2. Schematic Representation of Courage as 
a Basic Coping Mechanism in Stressful Situations 49 
3. Schematic Representation of Contemporary 
Conceptions of Courage 74 
v 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditional conceptions of courage, although abundant in 
definitions, remain steeped in confusion. Speculation as to the origins 
of courage are enshrouded in a vague form of determinism (e.g., social, 
moral (Moran, 1945); climatic, ethnic (Slim, 1957); religious (Barrie, 
1922)). A priori assumptions as to the nature of courage are often 
presented. Upon close examination, one can discern a multitude of con-
tradictions. For example, Slim (1957) describes physical courage as 
both an emotional and a mental state. 
In examining traditional conceptions of courage within the 
popular contexts of war, sports and religion, one begins to discern a 
definite evolutionary trend. Quite probably stemming from Stoic tradi-
tion (Tillich, 1952), early writers (e.g., Moran, 1945) stress the cog-
nitive aspect of courage. While the presence of fear or the affective 
aspect of "feeling" (Clausewitz, 1968) was recognized, it was controlled 
by reason, understanding and will power. The ideal was the absence of 
fear. Writers in the religious tradition (Barrie, 1922; Bradley, 1934; 
Moore, 1951) provide some link with the affective when stressing the 
importance of the self in maintaining faith and passive endurance. 
Sportsmen emphasize physical courage and an active endurance of physical 
stress. 
1 
2 
Pioneer contributions of psychologists appear to have accom-
plished nothing more than to reinforce the already predominant trend to 
value moral as opposed to physical courage. The positive moral or 
spiritual courage to live is preferred over the negative physical cour-
age to die (Meerloo, 1944;. Birnbaum, 1948). Birnbaum's (1948) concep-
tion of courage as "totaleinstellung" or as a total concept, and as an 
attitude which demands action in properly coping with life's problems, 
allows for a skeletal conceptualization of traditional courage. 
The determinism inherent in traditional conceptions of courage 
allows for an explanation within the general framework of a Stimulus-
Response (S-R) model. The notion of "compulsive masculinity" (Parsons, 
1947) and social-psychoanalytic conceptions of internalization, and 
hence, unconscious conformity to societal norms (Atkin, 1971) also appear 
to be appropriate explanatory frameworks. The emphasis on war as the 
rite de passage to manhood is explained as a symbolic attachment (Katz, 
1967) to traditional conceptions of courage. 
Courage, when discussed within the context of basic survival 
situations (e.g., concentration camps (Frank, 1952; Pawlowicz, 1962); 
isolation experiences (Lilly, 1956; Noyce, 1962); disaster situations 
(Quarantelli & Dynes, 1973)) is viewed primarily as an affective con-
struct. Self-reliance often emerges as a basic and necessary antecedant 
condition. The mediating variable and private nature of hope, with its 
future orientation and roots in a need for affiliation (N-Aff.) allows 
for a more complex and interdependent relationship. 
Active and successful coping with stress and the maintenance 
of a courageous attitude towards suffering are based on a cognitive and 
3 
voluntary decision-making process. The decision to live or to die is 
more clearly defined as man's ultimate choice (Frankl, 1963). Thus, 
self-determination is an integral aspect of courage and survival. 
Implicit in the decision to cope with stress in a courageous 
manner is the concept of a goal. This goal is defined not merely in 
the concrete sense of saving a physical life, but in the broader, exis-
tential and abstract sense of ultimate psychological survival. Emphasis 
is placed on the maintenance of personal autonomy, integrity, independ-
ence, dignity, self-respect and meaning in life (Frankl, 1963; Bettle-
heim, 1960). The decision to give up hope and hence, courage, seems to 
preclude the possibility of such abstract goal-seeking behaviour. The 
resultant behavioural response of successfully coping with stress might 
be interpreted as a form of risk-taking behaviour. One chooses to risk 
physical death in an effort to maintain self-respect and strive towards 
ultimate psychological survival. 
The need for a changed conception of courage has been indi-
cated by several writers (Mack, 1969; Markowltz, 1971; Kincald & Kincald, 
1971). The moral courage of traditional conceptions and the importance 
of the self stressed in survival situations, are collapsed, in contem-
porary conceptions of courage, into a more comprehensive personal in-
volvement. Implicit in more recent conceptions of courage is a sense 
of self-determinism and freedom of choice. The basic Stimulus-Organism-
Response (S-O-R) model serves as a general framework for contemporary 
definitions of courage. 
Contemporary courage, as examined in this paper, may be de-
fined as the voluntary acceptance of the risk inherent in a commitment 
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towards and active adherence to the attitudes, values, ideals and 
belief systems of the new culture. Cultural change, and the proposed 
emergence of a new culture, in direct opposition to the old, (Keniston, 
1965; Slater, 1971) is viewed as being the precipitating factor for a 
changed conception of courage. 
The uncertainty of achieving new culture goals and the pos-
sible negative reprisals from old culture adherents, suggests that a 
decision to actively adhere to such a system may constitute considerable 
risk. The voluntary nature of such a choice suggests that cognitive 
hypotheses which stress information exchange and behavioural decision 
theory (Vinokur, 1971) may be most appropriate as explanatory frameworks. 
The possibility that contemporary courage may be characteristic of those 
with a veridical self-perception as "risky" (Clark & Crockett, 1971) as 
well as indicating a general disposition towards risk (Jackson, Hourany 
& Vidmar, 1972) is presented. 
Qualitative distinctions within contemporary courage may be 
isolated by examining the precise nature of one's attitude and commit-
ment towards new culture belief systems. The use of concepts such as 
"bolstering" (Mann & Taylor, 1970; Mann, 1971) in combination with the 
isolation of choice difficulty (i.e., levels of commitment to action for 
change within the new culture) may indicate the presence or absence of 
dissonance. A closer examination of actions consistent with attitudes 
suggests that only a minority are actually actively involved in actions 
designated to produce positive change (e.g., Miller, 1970; Morse & Peele, 
1971). The abstract nature of the expressed goals (i.e., change, peace, 
co-operation) and the loosely organized pursuit of these goals, in 
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combination with the low probability of immediate concrete success sug-
gests that contemporary courage may call for an External as opposed to 
an Internal control orientation (Granberg & May, 1972). 
Contemporary courage, as presented in this paper, is postu-
lated as being a general definitional concept. Theoretically, it should 
be applicable to committed activists of whatever age and nationality. 
The basic feature is the freely chosen and cognitively based decision 
to actively commit oneself to working for change in a manner consistent 
with new culture belief systems. The following effort is exploratory 
in nature. The basic constituents of contemporary courage have been 
examined theoretically and presented in a preliminary model. Future 
research should concentrate on further operationalizing the various 
aspects of contemporary courage, as presented, and subjecting them to 
empirical test within the possible frameworks suggested. 
FIGURE I 
Schematic representation of Trad itiona 
A Noticeable Trend in the 
Development of Courage as 
a Total Concept 
I Emphasis on the 
Cognitive Aspect 
I I Emphasis on the 
Cognitive Aspect, 
i.e., courage as a 
mental state 
plus: Affective Aspect, 
i.e., moral courage 
and the impor-
tance of the 
"self" 
III Emphasis on 
Behavioral Aspect, 
i.e., physical courage 
plus: acknowledging moral 
courage as higher 
qualitatively 
IV Emphasis on Behavioral 
(Moral/spiritual) Aspect, 
i.e., value placed on 
courage to live, 
positive courage 
V Emphasis on courage as a 
Total Concept, 
i.e., courage as attitude 
which demands action 
Cognitive, Affective 
plus Behavioral 
Courage as "Totaleinst ellung 
COGNITIVE 
self-control 
reason 
will power 
mental state 
mind (Neuer) 
understanding 
AFFECTIVE 
the "self" 
fear 
feeling 
faith 
self-confidence 
self-discipline 
TYPES OF COURAGE 
A 
il Conceptions of Courage 
BEHAVIORAL 
properly coping 
with difficulties 
in life and/or 
physical stress e.g., social courage; positive courage or 
personal revolt; 
"mut" or positive 
courage 
MORAL COURAGE 
I 
strong character 
passive faith, i.e., 
resisting temptation 
perseverance 
(higher qualitatively) 
Courage 
as 
Attitude 
Courage 
to 
Live 
Courage 
to 
Die 
(higher qualita-
tively) 
(lower qualita-
tively) 
e.g., "fall-mut" - i.e. no 
fear, hazardous or 
negative courage; 
collective ecstacy or 
negative courage 
PHYSICAL COURAGE Which 
Demands 
strong body 
active physical endurance 
(lower qualitatively) 
Natural 
Courage 
(no fear) 
Action 
Motivation 
Courage 
of 
Control 
(higher qualita-
tively) 
(lower qualita-
tively) 
e.g., money 
fame 
altruistic intentions 
conformity to social norms 
ethical/moral, i.e., to be of value 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Courage and War 
Traditional conceptions of courage are frequently closely 
associated with war and demonstrations of heroism therein (Moran, 1945; 
Slim, 1957; Crane, 1960; Clausewitz, 1968). Primary emphasis is placed 
on the response of bravery and the demonstration of physical courage in 
battle. Moral courage is mentioned only in passing as being a higher 
and ideal form of courage by all the above writers. When considering 
the origins of courage one finds a definite flavour of psychic determin-
ism and a sense of social and moral elitism present (Moran, 1945). The 
data show a complete lack of empiricism and remain totally at the level 
of speculation. An abundance of contradictory comments, a definite 
ethnocentrism, and some elements of sexism (Slim, 1957) are also noted. 
Present-day symbolic adherence to such traditional conceptions of cour-
age are still in evidence (Golden, 1971). 
Moran (1945) defined courage within the framework of danger 
and war. He stated: "It is a platitude of war that the worth of no man, 
however able, is proven until it has been submitted to ordeal by battle, 
until his response to the havoc of war is known" (p. 53). Implicit in 
the above statement is Moran's conception of the courageous man as one 
of worth, and more specifically, as a man of good moral sense, and good 
character. Moran explicitly states that "courage...is the expression on 
the battlefield of character" (p. 147). 
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The traditional ideal for Moran was the fearless soldier. On 
an a priori basis Moran outlined four orders of men: 1) those who felt 
no fear, 2) those who felt fear but did not show it, 3) those who felt 
fear, showed it, but still managed to do their job, and 4) those who 
felt fear, showed it and ran. Concommitant with the above four orders 
of men were four degrees of courage. Thus, Moran established a qualita-
tive distinction among men of courage in war. The ideal was the man who 
felt no fear. This was the real man of courage. Although men could move 
between the four stages, Moran spoke of the desire of men in war to re-
main on the "upper rungs of this ladder" (p. 22). 
Moran differentiated between "natural courage" and the "courage 
of control". This distinction seemed to be based on his ideal of the 
courageous soldier who felt no fear. Moran contended that natural cour-
age, the courage of insensibility, was almost extinct among officers in 
the army. He ascribed to natural courage the characteristics of lack of 
imagination, a vacant mind and fearlessness. He states: "the armies of 
long ago were recruited from men who did not feel fear. Their courage 
seems to have had its roots in a vacant mind. Their imagination played 
no tricks. They drew no pictures of danger for their own undoing" (p. 23). 
Moran's talk of imagination seems to refer to some type of 
anxiety-reaction, of soldiers conjuring up in their minds fears not based 
in reality. His own expression for this anxiety was that they experi-
enced "alternatives". Instead of dealing rationally with the task at 
hand, some men pondered over the dangers which might occur should they 
perform the task. In view of the many and varied religious beliefs of 
primitive peoples one might seriously question the natural courage, fear-
lessness and lack of imagination of "armies of long ago." The extensive 
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system of gods and spirits and adherence of primitive peoples to anim-
istic and pantheistic religious belief systems does not seem to support 
Moran's contention that "their imagination played no tricks" (p. 23). 
Moran is also extremely vague with respect to his meaning of "armies of 
long ago". The armies to which he refers remain a mystery. 
The courage of control seems to be a courage belonging to the 
rational man who considers "alternatives". It is depicted as a forced 
and unnatural courage and hence secondary in quality to the natural 
courage of old. To the former Moran ascribed an imagination which was 
controlled by character and reason. The thinking and self-controlled 
man would not allow his imagination to run riot. Rather, he put his 
imagination to his advantage by structuring the situation. All possible 
dangers were considered. The soldier with the courage of control then 
faced these dangers with his fear in control. 
For Moran, the proper attitude in battle, the courageous atti-
tude, was a fearless one. His types (natural courage and courage of 
control) may however simply reflect fanciful projections into the past. 
They may be based on his obvious dissatisfaction with the quality of 
fighting exhibited by the conscripted soldier. He idealized the soldier 
who felt no fear. Moran is unable to substantiate this ideal via eye-
witness accounts. He therefore concedes to the fact that men may feel 
fear and still be courageous. He resorts to an emphasis on reason and 
self-control as a basis for this courage of control. His confused specu-
lations and unsound assumptions are summarized and left open to argument 
when he states: "My very types are suspect...the existence of natural 
courage (fearlessness) as opposed to the courage of control, in any age 
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may be challenged... it is open to argument whether there is or ever has 
been anyone who does not feel fear" (p. 23). 
In categorizing his four orders of men Moran placed at the 
bottom of the list those who felt fear, showed it and ran. One might 
assume from this that Moran would also base his discussion of cowardice 
primarily on its relationship to fear. Moran, however, makes the state-
ment that cowardice is not equal to fear. He defines cowardice in an 
almost totally behaviouristic context. He states: "The Army Act lays 
down that a man is guilty of cowardice when he displays 'an unsoldier-
like regard for his personal safety in the presence of the enemy' by 
shamefully deserting his post or laying down his arms" (p. 24). Coward-
ice was viewed as something a man did. It was very narrowly defined by 
Moran as simply running away in the face of the enemy during battle. A 
further assumption was that cowardice, as operationally defined above, 
is a disgrace and a shameful form of behaviour. 
Moran stated, the strength of the common, conscripted soldier, 
the "yokel" was based not primarily on real courage but rather, on his 
inability to perceive the situation as being really dangerous. He was 
more likely to be performing recklessly than courageously. Moran states: 
"He is so staunch in battle because he never stopped to reason, to mea-
sure the odds, or to reflect on his own chances of survival" (p. 71). 
The courageous man is described by Moran as a man of good 
character and good moral sense. The coward is typically depicted as a 
common person, a "yokel", a weak man of poor character. A stance of 
social elitism might dictate that fear could not possibly describe both 
the courageous and the cowardly individual. It is perhaps this form of 
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reasoning which prompted Moran to make his distinction between coward-
ice and fear. His sense of social elitism may not have allowed him to 
ascribe similar emotions and similar emotional responses to two differ-
ent classes of men. Thus, it could not be fear which makes cowards of 
men, for there are men who feel fear and still perform bravely and un-
selfishly in battle. Only the action of running away labelled a man a 
coward. Moran attempted to define and thus explain cowardice in the 
following manner: 
By cowardice I do not mean fear. Fear is the response of the 
instinct of self-preservation to danger. It is only morbid, 
as Aristotle taught, when it is out of proportion to the 
degree of the danger. In invincible fear- 'fear stronger than 
I am' - the soldier has to struggle with a flood of emotion; 
he is made that way...cowardice, that is the label we reserve 
for something that a man does. What passes through his mind 
is his own affair, (p. 24) 
Moran tried to define both courage and cowardice in primarily 
a cognitive framework. The definitive aspects of courage appear to be 
reason, will power and self-control. The unfortunate presence of fear 
is overcome in an honourable manner by the courageous man largely through 
use of his reasoning abilities. 
The emphasis on reason and cognition as determinants of cour-
age may explain Moran's contention that intelligence tests be employed 
in order to single out potential cowards by eliminating those whose minds 
are not developed enough. He states: "If these tests do not help to 
pick aces, they do help us to get rid of men who will not make soldiers" 
(p. 148). If such means are not employed to detect what Moran terms 
"latent weakness" in the young soldier (p. 147) then the final test of 
war must be employed. 
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Underlying Moran's treatment of courage is a strong sense of 
determinism. Implicit in this deterministic approach is a definite 
sense of social and moral Slitism. Moran was adament in his belief that 
courage is not a common entity, nor is it unlimited in quantity. Once a 
man's courage was used up, it was not restorable. Moran likened a man's 
courage to a bank account and stated: "A man's courage is his capital 
and he is always spending" (p. 17). There was a limit to the number of 
good men that any nation could furnish. In times of peace as well as in 
war, all fine things are the work of only a few men. 
Moran fails to specify the exact origins of this limited quan-
tity of courage which is extant in only a few good men. It is not born 
as a result of the war process, for war serves only to exaggerate or 
bring forth the qualities, courageous or cowardly, which exist in men in 
time of peace. War, Moran claimed, could not change a man. A man is 
either weak or he is strong and situations only elicit these inherent 
qualities. Physical hardships of war which may lead to nervous fatigue 
and boredom, will wear down only the man who is initially inclined to be 
cowardly and weak. Men who broke under the stress of battle were des-
cribed by Moran as lacking in moral sense "without which no soldier can 
endure the stress and terror of the modern battle field" (p. 148). 
Moran contends that fortitude in times of war has its roots in 
morality. Selection is the search for character and "war itself is but 
one more test, the supreme and final test...of character" (p. 154). A 
man of character in peace becomes a man of courage in war. He thought 
of courage as a moral quality, as self-discipline, which could readily 
be evidenced in times of peace. Although Moran mentions certain standards 
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of peace to which people pay scant attention, standards which could 
point out the courageous men, he never explicitly stated what these am-
biguous standards are. 
Moran's slight elaboration of his meaning of "character" leads 
us no further than the moralistic basis already ascribed to courage. He 
states that character is the habit of choosing right over wrong, the 
development of a strong conscience. This moral quality of choosing 
right over wrong grows to maturity in times of peace and is suddenly 
developed and brought out by war. War does not change our basic nature, 
it merely exposes it. "Man's fate in battle is worked out before war 
begins...his actions in war are dictated not by courage, nor by fear, 
but by conscience, of which war is the final test...if you know a man in 
peace, you know him in war" (Moran, p. 154). 
Thus, courage, according to Moran, has its roots in some vague 
and undefined form of psychic determinism. This determinism is itself 
embedded in some form of Christian morality. To complicate further the 
issue of both definition and origin, Moran adds the prejudicial element 
of social elitism. He states that "good soldiers are not bred from bad 
stock" (p. 152). It is also not pure chance that in war some men are 
branded cowards and others courageous. Some men, Moran claims, were 
cowards before they ever became soldiers. For this reason they fail to 
stand up to the rigours of battle. A battle serves only to "carry out 
the weeding process a little further. It raises the standards of the 
test a little more and thus strengthens the bond between the 'elect'" 
(p. 125). 
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Courage then, appears to be a socially determined character-
istic. It has its roots in morality and finds its recognized expression 
primarily through the channels of battle in times of war. If a man has 
been morally inadequate in the past, he will continue to prove himself 
so in the future. If he is inherently of weak character and conscience, 
then he will prove cowardly in war. Courage is the moral quality of the 
man of character, the virtuous man. 
Courage is a moral quality; it is not a chance gift of nature 
like an aptitude for games. It is a cold choice between two 
alternatives, the fixed resolve not to quit; an act of 
renunciation which must be made not once but many times by 
the power of the will. Courage is will power. (Moran, p. 71) 
Moran leaves one with three basic definitions of courage. It 
is a social quality, a moral quality and a cognitive quality. These are 
all somehow aspects of a man's character and seen in an absolute sense 
as being either present or absent. On this basis Moran judges men as 
exhibiting either courage or cowardliness in battle. He fails, however, 
to perceive the basic contradiction in his thinking. Ascribing quali-
ties such as will power, self-control, moral knowledge of right and 
wrong and a social basis to courage implies that courage may be deve-
loped or learned. 
The deterministic basis of courage, in addition to its relig-
ious overtones and an adherence to the ideal of the fearless soldier are 
also very evident in Slim (1957). Courage is defined by Slim as "the 
basic virtue in man or beast" (p. 3). Thus, he not only places courage 
in an ethical context but relates it to the animal realm as well. Slim 
never does explain this inclusion of animals in his discussion of cour-
age. Anyone who possesses courage, he says, must automatically be good, 
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for "you can't be good without being brave" (p. 5). Furthermore, cour-
age is not only the basis of all virtue, it is its expression." Courage 
is the virtue. Without it there are no other virtues. Faith, hope, and 
charity and other virtues do not become virtues until it takes courage 
to exercise them" (Slim, p. 5). 
If courage is the basic virtue as Slim claims, then, following 
from his comment that you cannot be good without being brave, it might 
be possible to determine whether or not someone is courageous. One might 
procure measures of external religiosity and thus isolate the Churchgoers 
or for example, the philanthropists. Using Slim's definition as a cri-
terion measure of courage, one might be able to deduce that these "vir-
tuous" people would also necessarily be "courageous". By virtue of ex-
clusion, however, the non-churchgoers and the poor who have no external 
means of demonstrating their charity, or their "goodness", would have to 
be classified as "non-courageous". The solution to defining courage and 
hence determining who the brave really are is not as simple as Slim's 
initial definition would make it appear. 
Slim becomes entangled in one of his own contradictions. He 
also states that "you may be bad and brave" (p. 5). This leaves us vir-
tually stranded as far as having a clear-cut ethical measure of courage 
available. We can neither define "virtue", "good", or "bad" and hope to 
arrive at a viable determinant of courage. Slim has thoroughly confused 
the issue. According to his two-sided, ethically based definition, all 
people have at least the sufficient if not the necessary condition for 
being brave. We could only assume that some people, the good people, may 
be more courageous than the bad people. Also, Slim's confusion of good, 
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bad and brave seems to be inherently illogical. If courage is a virtue 
and the basis of all virtues, then it should follow that if bad people 
can be courageous, then they should also be called virtuous people, or 
perhaps be classified as "good" people. In short, Slim's discussion of 
courage as the basic virtue leaves much to be desired in terms of poten-
tial for empiricism. His definition of courage is circular and sounds 
much like mere traditional rhetoric. 
Slim also defines courage as "a mental state" (p. 5). The 
sources of strength for this mental state called courage are both spiri-
tual and intellectual. Slim states: 
The way in which these spiritual and intellectual elements 
are blended, I think, produces roughly two types of courage. 
The first, an emotional state, which urges a man to risk 
injury or death- physical courage. The second, a more rea-
soning attitude which enables him cooly to stake career, 
happiness, his whole future on his judgment of what he thinks 
either right or worthwhile- moral courage, (p. 5) 
On the basis of the above definition, physical courage is obviously the 
lesser qualitatively, and a distinction is established. Man is a reason-
ing creature and it seems not at all unlikely that on this basis alone 
Slim would attach greater salience to moral courage. He states that 
"moral courage is a higher and a rarer virtue than physical courage" 
(p. 6). He appears to be employing the terms "spiritual" and "intellec-
tual" in the sense of emotional and rational respectively. 
One obvious contradiction in Slim's discussion of courage as a 
mental state is his description of moral courage, as noted in the brief 
quote above, as "a rarer virtue". Thus, courage appears to be a mental 
state, with its psychological properties of emotion and cognition creat-
ing a qualitative distinction between moral and physical courage. It is 
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also a virtue, thus attributing to courage a religious, ethical sense, 
one which forms the basis for a general good approach towards life. 
Slim not only fails to explain why he calls courage both a virtue and a 
mental state, but he also fails to provide adequate definitions of the 
terms he so loosely employs. His assumptions and definitions, as do 
those of Moran (1945) lack an empirical basis. 
A more blatant and damaging contradiction occurs in Slim's 
discussion of physical courage. He claims that the buttress of physical 
courage is to have good control of your imagination, not to let your 
mind frighten you, not to allow fears of the unknown or undue anxiety 
take hold of you in a stressful situation. Physical courage can be 
taught. You can "train the man not to draw too heavily on his stock of 
courage. Teach him what to expect, not to be frightened by bogeys-by 
the unknown" (p. 9). The essence of physical courage seems to be expec-
tation and the path to courage education with respect to what one might 
expect in any given situation. Physical courage could be summed up in 
the words: expectation, confrontation, skill. 
Slim's definition of physical courage contains qualities very 
similar to Moran (1945) in that he attributes reasoning or cognitive com-
ponents to courage. Slim, however, goes one step beyond Moran in that 
he acknowledges that courage, at least physical courage, can be taught. 
The contradiction lies in Slim's prior definition of physical and moral 
courage. In that definition he attributed reasoning qualities to moral 
and not to physical courage. The latter, Slim stated, had primarily an 
emotional basis. 
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Again similar to Moran (1945), Slim adheres to a vague and 
relatively undefined form of determinism. Slim states that all men are 
born with a certain amount of courage, "a certain capital". There are 
differences in initial amounts for different people. He states: 
All men have some degree of physical courage, it is surpris-
ing how much. Courage you know is having money in the bank. 
We start with a certain capital of courage, some large, some 
small, and we proceed to draw on our balance, for, don't 
forget, courage is an expendible quality. We can use it up. 
If there are heavy, and, what is more serious, if there are 
continuous calls on our courage we begin to overdraw. If we 
go on overdrawing, we go bankrupt - we break down. (Slim, p. 6) 
Like Moran (1945), Slim does not explain from where this initial amount 
of courage eminates; nor does he state why some are initially more gift-
ed with courage than others. 
Slim presents us with the confused definition of courage as a 
virtue, a quality, a mental state, which we all possess in varying 
amounts, and which is expendible. Using up all of our endowed courage 
results in an inability to function, a breakdown. The non-courageous 
are those who have expended their supply. 
Slim does speculate as to the origin of courage in general, 
especially the "particularly practical and effective kind of courage" 
displayed by the British. Thus, a definite ethnocentrism colours Slim's 
conception of courage. He calls this courage of the British a "natural 
courage" and links it to their geographical origins. Somehow, having 
your ancestry stem from the Northern part of Europe and having roots in 
the peoples of the Mediterranean, accounts for this natural courage. 
Slim does not define this term. One might speculate that its meaning is 
close to that posited by Moran (1945) - who defined natural courage as 
the fearless courage of ancient armies. 
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Where a people had lived for the past five or six hundred 
years, Slim stated, was a determining factor of the stated racial differ-
ence in courage. He combines geographical background with social and 
economic prevailing conditions and thus determines the degree of courage 
possessed by a particular race. With the exception of brief references 
to the courage of the Japanese, Germans and the British during the war, 
Slim does not specify races and their degree of courage. He does state: 
If it has been in a land where it did not take much effort to 
get enough food, clothing and shelter for an easy life, they 
will not be conspicuously brave. 
If they have lived where life is so hard that it is a terrible 
struggle against nature to keep any standard of living at all, 
then they will be brave in a few things - dangers to which they 
are inured - but not at all brave in others. 
It is the lands where nature is neither too easy nor too cruel, 
where a man must work hard to live but where his efforts and 
his enterprise can bring him great rewards, that breeds courage 
and is where it becomes a natural tradition, (pp. 10-11) 
In the second paragraph, one detects the influence of Puritan ethics and 
the belief that life is a test. Within the third paragraph seems to lie 
the New World capitalistic tradition of competition. 
In addition to his poorly defined racial and/or social-economic 
determinism, Slim completes his definition by attributing a definite 
religious basis to courage. Instead of merely defining courage as a 
virtue, he now claims that "we have based our natural courage on faith, 
a belief that we worked or fought for the things that mattered - a decent 
life" (p. 11). This addition of "faith" as a determining characteristic 
of courage only serves to confound further the issue. It is as dubious 
and meaningless as Moran's (1945) reference to character and conscience 
as the basis of courage. 
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Perhaps to justify his ethnocentric stance, Slim joins reli-
gious terminology with time and refers to courage as a "long-term virtue" 
(p. 10). He claims that "anyone can be brave for a little while...we 
the British, have our own special kind of courage, the courage that goes 
on, and endurance is the very essence of courage" (p. 10). Slim tries 
to say that the British soldier is not braver than other soldiers, he is 
only braver for a longer period of time and this is what counts. 
With the introduction of "endurance" as being the very basis 
of courage and Slim's further description of this enduring courage as 
staying "where he is until he has won" (p. 49) one might derive a pos-
sible operational definition of courage. Courage could be defined as 
being equivalent to Endurance (E), which is a function of the time re-
maining at a specified task (f)t(x), divided by Time which is specified 
as a fixed value t(y) and equal to 1. 
Equation: C - E(f) | ^ - = 1 
One could speculate that endurance will increase with the proportional 
increase of time £ remains at a specified task. The closer the resultant 
equation is to 1, the higher the degree of courage which might be attri-
buted to S_. 
To complicate the issue further, Slim attributes a definite 
gender to courage by referring to it as a "male attitude" (p. 5). This 
obvious sexism may be closely tied to the traditional conception of cour-
age and bravery on the battlefield. Slim again introduces a basic con-
tradiction. He states: "Whether women are braver than men I don't know, 
but I have always found them, when really tested, at least equally brave" 
(p. 10). He makes vague reference to the bravery of the women in India, 
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the refugees, who were "patient, uncomplaining, devoted, thinking only 
of their families, so very brave" (p. 10). This might simply be a token 
bravery, stemming perhaps from the traditional role conception of the 
devoted and uncomplaining mother. As for Slim's purported "tests" of 
courage, these are left unspecified. Employing sex as a variable in 
further research might clarify the issue. 
Clausewitz (1968) also linked courage with danger in war. His 
definitions of courage concentrate on distinguishing moral and physical 
courage. He remains more the philosopher-soldier and does not confound 
his definitions with deterministic, ethnocentric and ethical factors. 
Clausewitz distinguishes between physical and moral courage and 
further differentiates these two types of courage as follows: 
Courage is of two kinds: first, physical courage, or courage 
in the presence of danger to the person; and next, moral 
courage, or courage before responsibility, whether it be be-
fore the judgement-seat of external authority, or of the inner 
power, the conscience. (p. 139) 
Courage before danger to the person, again, is of two kinds. 
First, it may be indifference to danger, whether proceeding 
from the organism or the individual's contempt of death, or 
habit: in any of these cases it is to be regarded as a per-
manent condition. Secondly, courage may proceed from positive 
motives, such as personal pride, patriotism, enthusiasm of 
any kind. In this case courage is not so much a normal con-
dition as an impulse. (pp. 139-140) 
The two kinds of courage combined, Clausewitz states, make up the "most 
perfect kind of courage" (p. 140). 
His treatment of courage and its definition, is however, by no 
means clear. He employs confusing terminology, in the tradition of 
writers such as Slim (1957) and Moran (1945), and proceeds to call cour-
f age a "moral quality" (p. 116), an "impulse" (p. 140) and "a nobler 
22 
instinct" (p. 187). His reference to courage as "a power in itself" 
(p. 187) does nothing to clarify the situation. 
In his treatment of the possible origins of courage, Clausewitz 
seems to be combining both cognitive and affective elements. He refers 
to the former as some form of "understanding" (p. 142) and to the latter 
as a "feeling" (p. 187). Unlike Moran (1945) and Slim (1957), he de-
emphasizes the role of cognition and places emphasis on the affective 
nature of courage. "The mind must, therefore, first awaken the feeling 
of courage and then be guided and supported by it, because in momentary 
emergencies the man is swayed more by his feelings than his thoughts" 
(p. 142). He states that courage is definitely not "an act of the under-
standing, but likewise a feeling, like fear" (p. 187). Courage is not 
simply a prescribed response to danger but an inner power which is con-
cerned also with man's moral preservation. 
Thus, Clausewitz defines courage as having its base within the 
individual. A combination of affective and cognitive elements interact 
and result in a behaviour termed courage. This behaviour is, however, 
still definitely tied to the battlefield and situations of combat danger 
therein. Although deterministic statements as to who the courageous will 
be are absent, the Stimulus is still war, and the Response bravery or 
courage. 
Crane's novel The Red Badge of Courage (in Stallman, 1960) 
clearly illustrates the traditional conception of courage as perceived by 
Slim (1957) and Moran (1945). The incorporation of courage as defined by 
them, into novel form, suggests that these conceptions of courage may 
have been cultural values rather than simply isolated definitions of a 
specific behaviour. 
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Henry Fleming's (The Red Badge of Courage) desire to go to 
war and his wish for "a wound, a (little) red badge of courage" (p. 59) 
illustrates the need which existed to prove yourself a man in battle 
and to be able to demonstrate this to others. Of himself, Henry states: 
He finally concluded that the only way to prove himself was 
to go into the blaze, and then figuratively, to watch his 
legs to discover their merits and faults. He could not sit 
still and with a mental slate and pencil derive an answer. 
To gain it he must have the blaze, blood and danger...so he 
fretted for an opportunity, (p. 21) 
Courage appears to be an observable action, a visible demon-
stration of your manhood. This suggests that in order to maintain one's 
self-esteem a man has to prove himself in a dangerous situation. War is 
a socially approved mode of achieving this goal. Going to war may be a 
type of rite de passage. Predominant is a mysterious attraction to the 
field of battle and the accompanying myth of an unveiling or a sudden 
transformation. Henry Fleming "had been taught that a man became an-
other thing in battle. He saw his salvation in such a change...to go 
into battle and discover that he had been a fool in his doubts and was 
in truth a man of traditional courage" (The Red Badge of Courage, in 
Stallman, p. 59). 
The traditional ideal of the fearless soldier posed some prob-
lems for Henry. He could not bring himself to admit openly and discuss 
his own fear with others, nor was his fear acceptable to himself. The 
deterministic and elitist belief that "the boys come of good stock, and 
most of 'em '11 fight like sin after they oncet git shootin'..." (p. 120) 
may have, on a superficial level, helped to alleviate his distress. 
Psychologically, this conflict between the ideal and the real appears to 
be a case of cognitive dissonance. 
24 
Henry's personal experience of fear in battle and the ideal 
of the fearless, heroic soldier were not consistent. In order to main-
tain the ideal of courage in war he had to project blame onto the Govern-
ment who had started the war and forced him to enlist. He viewed the 
government as plotting to put an end to his life by making him fight its 
battles. He had been coerced into a dangerous situation, for the explic-
it purpose of killing him! Thus, should he run away it would not be due 
to his own cowardice, lack of courage or submission to fear. "It 
occurred to him that he had never wished to come to the war. He had not 
enlisted of his free-will. He had been dragged by the merciless govern-
ment. And now they were taking him out to be slaughtered"(p. 30). In 
reality, Henry had enlisted voluntarily. 
In view of Henry Fleming's fear of death and injury and his 
subsequent flight from battle it might be appropriate to label him a cow-
ard according to Moran's definition. However, his fear of ridicule from 
others, his fear of the label "coward" and his desire to possess a wound, 
a visible sign of courage, led him back to the battle. Thus, in the 
same individual, we perceive the coward (Moran's definition) and the 
courageous lad who returned to successfully complete his duty (Slim's 
definition). This is definitely inconsistent with the notion of a pre-
determined courage. Moran's explanation of a possible "commotional 
shock" experience is not viable since Henry had made a definite decision 
to run and then to return. A more comprehensive definition of courage, 
one which incorporates the real as well as the ideal in a model with a 
more substantial basis seems necessary. 
25 
Traditional conceptions of courage and war appear to have 
their basis primarily in a priori assumptions and speculations. Their 
definitions lack an empirical basis and have failed to take into account 
the actual experience of the person in the dangerous or stressful situa-
tion. Courage is therefore viewed as being an "absolute" rather than a 
"relative" characteristic. 
Religious Courage 
Moral courage and a passive and enduring attitude towards 
life's struggles and temptations are stressed by writers in the relig-
ious tradition (Barrie, 1922; Bradley, 1934; Moore, 1951). The crucial 
test is not war and the activity of battle, but rather, life in general 
and a passive optimistic acceptance of its problems (Bradley, 1934). 
Courage is not determined by good character and conscience but is now 
described as being the basis for building a strong character (Moore, 
1951). Reference to courage as a God-given virtue (Barrie, 1922) suggests 
a form of religious determinism. Some confusion arises from the fact that 
the self is also stressed as an important determinant of courage. 
Barrie (1922) expresses views similar to Slim (1957) when he 
comments that courage is a virtue. He defines it somewhat metaphorically 
as "the lovely virtue...the rib of Himself that God sent down to his 
children" (p. 7). Like Slim, he also includes an apparently unrecognized 
and unresolved contradiction. Barrie compares courage to a staff which 
aids us in our journey through life. Courage is a strength which every-
one must build for himself. It is unclear as to which takes precedence, 
the self-derived strength or the other-derived virtue. One might specu-
late that this self-derived courage is the basis of a quantitative 
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difference in degree of courage which may exist in men. That is, man 
may, through his own efforts, work towards increasing the basic amount 
of God-given courage which he initially possesses. 
Barrie also supports the traditional ideal of heroism in war 
and the value of fighting for one's country. He emphasized the necessity 
of demonstrating one's manhood by proving oneself courageous in battle. 
Youth, he stressed, should be courageous and demand some partnership in 
decisions such as war which pertain to them. He states: "The end will 
have come to courage and to us when we are afraid in dire misfortune to 
refer the final appeal to the arbitrament of arms" (pp. 10-11). 
Bradley (1934) emphasized the importance of courage as a 
strength arising from the self. Inner control, self-discipline, confid-
ence and faith are the bases for building the inner strength which he 
calls courage. A courageous attitude towards hardships in life stems 
primarily from within and must always be assumed. A high value is placed 
on life which contains struggles and privations. For Bradley, the cru-
cial and necessary test of courage is the difficult life. Only through 
facing and overcoming problems can we build courage and a strong charac-
ter. 
The origin of courage and its precise definition, other than 
being defined as some sort of inner strength which builds character, is 
left in a state of confusion. Courage is at once born out of hardship 
and struggle and stems primarily from within. A third source is vaguely 
defined as "poise", from which "all strength is born" (p. 184). This 
poise is viewed as an attitude of faith in oneself and is described as 
sowing the seeds for courage. Courage itself is then further defined as 
"a reservoir which can be utilized for power" (p. 183). 
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Bradley defines moral courage as following one's convictions, 
breaking with tradition, and dedicating oneself to humanitarian causes 
even though they may be unpopular. He attributes to moral courage a 
higher qualitative status than physical courage. Anyone, Bradley claims, 
can leap into the water to save a drowning friend or walk into the face 
of a cannon. Fewer people, however, possess real moral bravery, as he 
defines it. Unfortunately Bradley fails to define moral courage in a 
more specific sense. Anyone who puts up with all of life's vicissitudes 
without complaining to any degree would be categorized by Bradley as be-
ing highly courageous. Also, he gives no reason for valuing passive en-
durance of life's struggles over the physical activity of saving a life. 
Moore (1951) distinguishes between the physical courage demon-
strated in war and the moral courage which is employed to resist tempta-
tion. Physical courage is an occasional occurrence, while moral courage 
is constantly required of us. Any Christian who resists and believes in 
the existence of constant temptation throughout life will, according to 
Moore's conception of courage, possess a high degree of moral courage. 
Moore himself claimed that standing for the right when it is unpopular, 
being faithful to duty when your heart is broken, and remaining a Chris-
tian in a pagan world all require courage. 
Moore further defines courage as "patience and long-suffering 
with joyfulness" (p. 35). The test of courage, a physical strength, is 
not activity but "the practice of passive virtues" (p. 35). Patience is 
the opposite of cowardice or despondency. Thus we are presented with a 
patient, long-suffering courage, a hopeful courage, a courage to faith, 
to turn the other cheek since "longsuffering contrasts with wrath and 
revenge" (p. 35). 
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Courage, as defined by the above writers, emerges simply as 
a strength. Further distinctions and definitions are largely coloured 
by the basic shared value placed on hardship and their Christian relig-
ious belief systems. Courage itself appears to lose all definitiveness. 
It could very well be ascribed to any Christian or uncomplaining sufferer. 
The Physical Courage of Sportsmen 
Frequent references to courage are made by sportsmen (Mantle, 
1964) and sports commentators (Schoor, 1967; Barber, 1969). Courage is 
viewed as a quality belonging to the sportsman who has demonstrated 
"determination", "self-confidence", "guts", and possesses a general 
orientation towards the competitive success ethic of North America 
(Mantle, 1964). Some writers question whether courage exists within the 
realm of champions (e.g., Schoor, 1967). Interviews with sportsmen 
(e.g., Playboy, 1972) seem to indicate the absence of courage per se as 
a major component of the self-concept of sportsmen. Their behaviour 
might be better described as "zest" (Russell, 1930). 
Mantle (1964) defines courage in an extremely broad context. 
His conceptions of courage are all closely aligned with physical action 
and strength, bravery and skill. Mantle's comment that courage is a 
"quality, not a thing whose physical dimensions you can describe" (p. 27) 
is as meaningless as the many types of courage he describes. He speaks 
of "the courage to try", "the courage of your convictions", "the courage 
of confidence", "instant courage", "the courage of toughness", "passive 
or quiet courage", "the courage to be yourself", "the courage to be honest, 
patient, to struggle on, to hope and to change". Mantle's comment that 
courage is also an everyday thing adds a definite universality to the 
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concept. Courage is conceived of as simply the man on the street, cop-
ing with day to day living, and doing his job. "The brave men are the 
ones who get the job done everyday" (p. 22). 
A distinction made between physical and moral courage (Barber, 
1969) is equally as vague and undefined. Barber comments: "Everyone 
has an obscure respect for courage in others especially if it is moral 
courage, the rarest and most difficult sort of bravery...it makes the 
very brute understand that this is more than a man" (p. 38). Moral cour-
age is discussed primarily within the context of breaking the colour bar 
in sports. It is viewed as an ideal which somehow signifies that you 
are a man among men. Moral courage is placed by Barber primarily within 
the realm of interpersonal relations and battling prejudice. Mantle 
(1964) described this breaking of the colour bar in sports as a "passive" 
courage. Quiet acceptance of abuse (moral courage) by Blacks, seems to 
be a pre-requisite for the demonstration of successful activity (physical 
courage), in sports. Persistance also appears to play a major role in 
moral courage. 
The operational definition derived in this writer's discussion 
of Slim (1957) might be useful in determining the sportsmens' degree of 
courage (p. 20). Distinguishing between physical and moral courage on 
the basis of this equation presents a problem. Barber's distinction 
would lead one to believe that, given the same outcome or proportion of 
courage, one would label the white man as "physically courageous" and 
the black man as "morally courageous". The assumption would be that both 
white and black Ss are new players and equated on other major variables 
such as size, experience and so on. 
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One might legitimately question the meaningfulness of the 
distinction between moral and physical courage as presented by the 
sportsmen cited. Should these two types of courage be differentiated 
on the basis of race, or should they be differentiated on the basis of 
active physical perseverance at a specific task. One might define moral 
courage as a general coping mechanism. Exceptional stress situations 
such as war and the stress of sports might be defined as physical cour-
age. However, the realization that these very distinctions are merely 
a priori assumptions, thoroughly confounded with ethical and social 
values, places serious limitations on any efforts to discern an empiri-
cal basis for them. Both physical and moral courage could be defined 
generally as a method of successfully coping with stress. 
Although Schoor (1967) makes the claim that "it's courage that 
makes the champion" (p. 20) there are others who dispute this fact. In 
his own book Schoor presents the contradictory opinion of a ballplayer, 
Red Schoendienst. Red felt that you could do anything, as long as you 
had the necessary determination to do it. Schoor remarks: "courage? 
Red wouldn't think it took courage to do the best you could at the game 
you loved" (p. 123). Again there exists a seemingly unrecognized and 
certainly unresolved contradiction. Courage may or may not be an element 
in achieving championship. 
Sportsmen frequently speak of courage within the context of 
success and winning a game (Mantle, 1964). Courage, is however, also a 
characteristic attributed to the defeated sportsman. It is a label 
proudly assigned to the man who has lost, yet has persevered and pres-
erved his pride by fighting to the end, by finishing the game. Schoor 
states that Barney Ross, a boxer, was still on his feet when the last 
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gong sounded. He had lost the championship, but he had not lost his 
pride. No one had witnessed a greater demonstration of courage in the 
ring. Thus, the concepts of time and endurance again emerge as crucial 
variables. Winning or losing is peripheral. It is how an individual 
wins or loses that counts. Of primary importance is keeping one's pride 
intact. 
A symposium in Playboy (1972) on sportsmen isolates a variable 
which may be central in determining the nature of courage in sportsmen. 
Questioning as to "why" these men participated in sports suggests motiva-
tions which may be key factors. The self-concept of being courageous is, 
however, conspicuously absent in the answers. Stressed was the import-
ance of skill, the desire to be the best and the need to drive oneself 
to victory. Monetary rewards as well as simply liking the sport and 
finding success satisfying to the ego were also mentioned. 
Physical courage might, in view of the above, be operationally 
defined in the narrow sense, as a prescribed specific behaviour within 
a specified context. Thus, a home run or remaining in the boxing ring 
until the final bell could be defined as physical courage. The ideal of 
moral courage, expressed by both sports and religious writers, might be 
more appropriately investigated as a "courageous attitude". Interpret-
ing moral courage as an attitude instead of a socially prescribed behav-
iour may lend itself to a more meaningful and viable investigation of 
courage outside the specific behavioural contexts of war, religion and 
sports. Within such a framework one could perhaps explain the presence 
of either physical and/or moral courage in different individuals. Attri-
buting a label such as "physical courage" to a person's overt behaviour 
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and attributing an attitude of courage to the person performing the 
behaviour may be two separate processes. Determinants of the first 
might be defined as practice in developing a specific skill, physical 
endurance and active perseverance. Determinants of the attitude might 
be more difficult to extract and could lead to personality correlates 
of courage. 
A major component of physical courage might be what Russell 
(1930) described as "zest". Zest connotes an interest in a great variety 
of things which life offers. Zest also implies a sense of adventure and 
a search for experience. Russell believed that zest was built on a 
sense of security, self-confidence and lack of fear. Some men, he 
claimed, exhibit this self-confidence and fearlessness by climbing 
mountains or conquering the seas. Russell also attributed zest to what 
this writer has termed a "courageous attitude". He mentions that some 
possess a general self-confidence towards life which is to be moreso 
admired. 
The notion of a qualitative distinction between the behaviour 
called physical courage and the attitude called moral courage although 
frequently mentioned, lacks empirical basis. It appears to stem primar-
ily from the inherent higher value placed on inner processes such as 
thought and feeling as opposed to outer behaviour. Attributing a higher 
qualitative value to one (i.e., moral courage) as opposed to the other 
(i.e., physical courage) seems to be an arbitrary decision. 
Pioneer Contributions of Psychologists 
Attempts of writers within the field of psychology (Neuer, 1936; 
Birnbaum, 1948; Meerloo, 1944; Adler, 1956) at defining courage have been 
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far from satisfactory. Several types of courage are discussed (Meerloo, 
1944) and a feeble effort made to justify the ensuing qualitative dis-
tinctions. Adler's definition of "social courage" is vaguely linked to 
the psychologically non-neurotic individual. Neuer (1936) goes no fur-
ther than merely defining courage as a social quality. The most compre-
hensive effort (Birnbaum, 1948) to discern the actual meaning of courage 
remains enshrouded in a quasi-philosophical approach. 
Meerloo (1944) established a distinction between the courage 
to live and the courage to die. The former is ascribed a higher value 
qualitatively. Similar to all writers previously cited, Meerloo offers 
no concrete or empirical basis for this ranking. Again, one can only 
assume that this distinction is perhaps quite arbitrary and closely 
linked to the value preference of the writer (in this instance, for life 
over death). 
Meerloo links courage with war and remarks that military decor-
ations are symbolic of courage or bravery. He does not, however, limit 
himself to such a narrow conception of courage. Meerloo feels that cour-
age is not of a simple nature. Calling certain deeds heroic is not suf-
ficient to explain courage. He described the highest form of courage (to 
live) as follows: 
(the highest form of courage is) that which springs from 
self-control. Here the individual dares to place himself 
in opposition to the mass, to break away from tradition, to 
assert his own personality, and is prepared to suffer for 
the sake of his convictions- such courage is creative. It 
attempts to overcome the boundaries imposed by man's animal 
nature; it is ready to break new ground, it is necessary to 
all growth, indeed to life itself...As a free people, we 
must choose the affirmative courage of life, not the negative 
sacrifice of death. (p. 61) 
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His conception of courage as arising from "self-control" provides an 
obvious link with writers of the war tradition. Speaking of the highest 
form of courage as one which involves "convictions" is also quite simi-
lar to religious writers' conceptions of the most valued form of courage. 
Thus, Meerloo's courage to live shares some similarities with religious 
conceptions of moral courage. Meerloo, however, further defines this 
valued courage by claiming that it is the necessary basis of all life 
and growth. As for knowing what this "basis" consists of, why it is 
necessary and why we should choose life, these are issues which Meerloo 
fails to confront and answer. 
Meerloo also distinguished between the courage of primitive 
peoples and the courage of the Greeks. He described the attitude of some 
unspecified primitive peoples as being iconoclastic or simple revolt. He 
viewed such forms of revolt not as courageous but as a crime. Those who 
revolted against the early tribal gods and customs were punished by death 
or exile. Meerloo confuses the issue by calling this iconoclastic revolt 
"negative courage" and thus not to be honoured as being heroic. Outwardly, 
Meerloo remarks, it might have the appearance of heroism, but in reality 
it is destructive behaviour. Linking the term "courage", even if negative, 
to a form of behaviour which he denies is courageous, certainly does 
little to clarify the issue. 
The Greeks, Meerloo states, possessed "hybris". This is de-
fined in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, College 
Edition, (Urdang, 1968), as "hubris, n. excessive pride or self-confidence; 
arrogance. Also, Hybris (Gk: insolence) (p. 644). Meerloo viewed this 
as being of a positive nature "which in disrupting established modes of 
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life might achieve progress" (p. 59). On what basis he views "exces-
sive pride" or "insolence" for that matter, as being positive, is not 
clear. Meerloo may simply be expressing his own biased views. 
Meerloo also distinguished between "personal revolt" and 
"collective ecstacy". The latter is characteristic of primitive bravery 
and of most army manoevers which are commonly termed heroic. Soldiers 
who perform great heroic deeds, Meerloo states, are in most cases simply 
exercising a form of collective bravery. Soldiers with nothing to live 
for no longer value their lives. As a result, they decide to give their 
lives for their country. He categorizes these soldiers as being primar-
ily members of the underground. They are not interested in any applause 
for their bravery. They simply have nothing left to live for. 
Meerloo defined "collective bravery" as "an ecstatic surrender 
to a suicidal impulse of the self". In primitive peoples this was ex-
hibited as a type of "mass excitement" wherein the individual lost him-
self in the crowd. As a result, he "performs deeds which without this 
stimulus he would never have contemplated" (p. 59). Meerloo claims that 
personal courage characterizes a democratic environment as opposed to 
primitive cultures. On this basis it is to be rated as being of higher 
value qualitatively. Historically, Greece was considered a democracy. 
Perhaps therein lies Meerloo's notion that "hybris" is of a positive 
nature. 
Meerloo does not explicitly state whether the courage to live, 
positive courage and personal revolt are one and the same form of cour-
age. Also, this writer can only speculate that collective courage, 
negative courage and the courage to die refer to one type of courage. 
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Meerloo seems to use these sets of terms interchangeably. None of them 
have been adequately defined. Another criticism lies in his assumption 
that most soldiers of the underground are suicidal and have nothing to 
live for. He fails to support this contention with sound empirical data. 
This reflects negatively on his discussion of courage. 
Neuer (1936) also takes recourse to the Greeks in support of 
his definition of courage. He defines "mut" or "courage" as the univer-
sal social quality of the human psyche. The courageous mind, or "soul" 
is defined as "the mind (spirit) that springs from, and lives in, com-
munity; that lives with and works for, community". He states that in the 
history of philosophy the word courage meant the same as "mind". Neuer 
also claims that the Greek word "Thymos" meant both courage and mind (or 
soul, spirit and emotion). It would have been extremely helpful had 
Neuer elaborated on his conception of "social", its relationship to 
"community", and hence the supposed origin of courage. As it stands, his 
definition is not very useful to a psychologist. At best, it can provide 
us only with the smallest hint that perhaps courage has some connection 
with social relationships or with the community within which we live. 
Adler (in Ansbacher, 1956) in the treatment of neurotics with 
his technique of Individual Psychology, attempts to increase courage and 
decrease discouragement in the person. Adler defines courage as a social 
courage, one which involves a basic social interest as well as activity. 
Activity and courage, however, are not necessarily equated. Alder states: 
"Only the activity of an individual who plays the game, cooperates, and 
shares in life can be designated as courage" (p. 166). He frequently 
defines courage in terms of the activity involved in expressing one's 
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social interest, in striving to overcome feelings of inferiority and 
actively confronting the tasks of life. He links self-confidence and 
courage, stating that they are the basis of all constructive and crea-
tive activity. 
Activity, as Adler speaks of it, appears to resemble healthy 
attitude towards life. He calls this attitude"courage". Thus, one 
might conceive of courage as a psychologically healthy, self-confident 
approach towards life. It does not seem to necessitate any specific 
overt behaviour other than a general social interest. 
Also within the realm of the therapeutic, Birnbaum (1948) des-
cribed "Fall-Mut" as "hazardous or bold courage". One might roughly 
translate this to mean "psychopathic courage". A person with this type 
of negative courage is indifferent towards any risk. According to 
Birnbaum, he feels no fear nor any anxiety. It looks like positive cour-
age. It is, however, only a reflection of positive courage, just as the 
diabolic is only a reflection of the divine. 
Both positive and negative courage, Birnbaum claims, have a 
common front, i.e., anxiety, or fear. Each individual's mode of solving 
this problem, of confronting fear, and dealing with it is different. 
The mode of positive courage is of more value. Birnbaum does not elabor-
ate on these modes of coping with fear and/or anxiety. From his vague 
discussion of a criminal and a judge, the former possessing "Fall-Mut" 
and the latter, positive courage, one might assume that adherence to the 
law may differentiate these modes of coping with fear. This is however 
only a speculation. 
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Birnbaum concludes with a circular statement which leaves one 
extremely unenlightened as to both the meaning of courage and the treat-
ment of "fall-mut". Fear, he says, will always be with us. Only cour-
age will have an effect on courage. One can only conquer the "fall-mut" 
by the courage that is the will to ascend and to move upwards. He iden-
tifies this unique and seemingly miraculous transformation as a trans-
formation from a copy to the original. 
Birnbaum (1948) presents his conception of the meaning of cour-
age in a second article. He remarks that since the days of Plato, cour-
age has remained on the outskirts of psychology. He makes the statement 
that its decisive part in common life is known and assumes that the 
reader is well aware of this decisive role which courage plays in every-
day life. He stresses the need for a psychology of courage which focus-
es its attention on courage and discouragement. Birnbaum then proceeds 
with a detailed, and somewhat repetitive treatise on courage. Discour-
agement is never again mentioned. 
One could, Birnbaum claims, call courage a total attitude, 
which involves all aspects of the human being. This "Totaleinstellung" 
seems to encompass cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects of the 
person. Thus, courage can be understood as an active concept, one which 
demands action and change. 
Birnbaum attempts to differentiate the active courage of the 
healthy person from that of the neurotic, who he claims, is also active. 
Self-confidence will not adequately differentiate the two. The coura-
geous person fulfils the condition of solving problems or the "tasks of 
life" in the right manner. This definition of the courage of the healthy 
person is quite similar to Adler's social courage. 
39 
Birnbaum, by attributing to courage the status of an attitude, 
attempts to separate it from behaviourism. He states that behaviourists 
would define courage as "the impression of the behaviour of a human be-
ing who solves the tasks of life" (p. 16). The resultant activity would 
be courage. Such a conception of courage, Birnbaum claims,is almost too 
simple to be true. If pure activity were all that courage entailed, then 
he feels that we might also rightfully attribute courage to dogs. 
To link courage with human beings he adds his "geisteswissen-
schaftliche Psychologie". Solving the tasks of life correctly involves 
placing value on your experiences. Action is the symbol of a man's value 
and herein lies the difference between animals and humans. Birnbaum 
states: 
The courageous person is from the standpoint of 'geistes-
wissenschaftliche psychologie' a responsible person who 
recognizes his deeds as symbols of his values and who does 
what is prescribed by an objective system of values. He 
obeys to a demand (like the animals do) but it is the de-
mand to be of value. From here, courage is the enhance-
ment of the value of the self, of one's values, or more 
precisely, it is the preservation of the value of the self. 
(p. 18) 
The three basic components of courage postulated by Birnbaum might be 
summarized as follows: 
1) Courage is an attitude, a total experience or "totalein-
stellung", founded on self-confidence. 
2) Courage is the correct solving of the problems of living, 
facing and meeting the tasks of life. 
3) Courage is the preservation of an objective value of the 
self which expresses itself in deeds, (p. 19) 
Birnbaum's three components of courage might be labelled as "Cognitive", 
"Behavioural" and "Affective". Contemporary conceptions of courage will 
be considered within such a "total" framework. 
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Summary Explanations 
Philosophi cal 
Traditional conceptions of courage which place emphasis on 
manliness and strength in war, and value as an ideal moral courage and 
a general striving towards life, can be understood within the framework 
of early philosophical conceptions of courage. Tillich (1952) summar-
izes the early philosophers' definitions of courage. 
The emphasis placed by Moran (1945) and Slim (1957) on reason 
and will power as being the primary component of courage strongly re-
flects the Stoic conceptions of the courage to be. Tillich states that 
Stoic courage was based on the control of reason. This reason refers to 
the person's core being, his center, and includes all mental functions. 
Still, Tillich states: "reasoning as a limited cognitive function, never 
could create courage" (pp. 12-13). Clausewitz's claim that courage is 
not an act of understanding, or a totally cognitive function, may also 
stem from the Stoic view. 
Nietzsche's ontology of courage (Tillich, p. 30) relates to 
conceptions of courage and fear by writers of the war tradition. They 
acknowledged the presence of fear but stressed the power of reason and 
will in facing and thus overcoming fear. Nietzsche states: "...he hath 
heart who knoweth fear but vanquisheth it; who seeth the abyss, but with 
pride. He who seeth the abyss but with eagle's eyes, - he who with the 
eagle's talons graspeth the abyss: he hath courage" (in Tillich, 1952). 
Stoic courage was also viewed as belonging to the Slite. From 
this conception of courage may stem Moran's definite social elitism. 
The general elitism, the definite sexism, and the description of courage 
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within the context of war can all be understood in light of Tillich's 
discussion of the "aristocratic tradition" (p. 5). In this era war was 
the realm of the aristocracy. As a result, courage was also linked with 
the Slite. This "heroic-aristocratic" conception of courage, which was 
revived by the knights of the Middle Ages, may be what Moran is referring 
to when he spoke of the fearless primitive soldiers. The greatest test 
of courage, Tillich claims, was a readiness to make the greatest sacri-
fice, one's life. The soldier was required by his profession to be al-
ways ready for this sacrifice. Thus, the soldier's courage was and 
somehow still remains, the outstanding example of courage. 
The sexism inherent in courage can be understood on the basis 
of the words employed to connote courage. The Greek word for courage, 
andrSia, can be translated as "manliness" (Tillich, p. 5). The Latin 
word, fortitude, means "strength" and thus may explain the military con-
notations of the word courage. 
The death of the aristocratic tradition gave rise to what 
Tillich terms a "rational-democratic" (p. 5) conception of courage. 
Courage was now defined as the universal knowledge of good and evil. 
The value placed on mind over matter, on the ethical components of moral 
courage, and the religious determinism of courage all appear to reflect 
the dominant thinking of this era. Linguistic derivations of courage 
(Fr. "coeur" and Gm. "mut") suggest that courage is also a matter of the 
heart. 
Aquinas, as did writers of the religious tradition, felt that 
perfect courage was a gift of "the Divine Spirit" (p. 8). Courage was 
united with the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. This relates 
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to Slim's conception of courage as the basic virtue. Faith and hope, 
Tillich says, reflect the ontological nature of courage, whereas love 
reflects its ethical component. 
Aristotle's conception of the courageous man, Tillich states, 
is one who "acts for the sake of what is noble, for that is the aim of 
virtue" (p. 4). Courage does what is to be praised. 
Tillich defines the early view of courage as an ethical con-
cept, as a human act, as a matter of value (p. 3). This, in addition 
to the views presented of courage being a Divine Gift and a virtue, 
might explain the emphasis placed on moral courage as an ideal. This 
was especially evident in the religious writers cited. 
The view presented by Meerloo as to the value of life and the 
emphasis placed on the mind or non-action characteristic of moral cour-
age also appears to stem from early philosophers. For Aquinas, courage 
was a strength of the mind and was united with wisdom. Courage was a 
virtue representing not only the unity of the four cardinal virtues, but 
was also subordinate to reason (Tillich, p. 7). Nietzsche's "will to 
power", Tillich states, connotes a striving towards life. A life which 
is willing to surpass itself is the good life. The good life is also 
the courageous life (p. 27). 
Birnbaum's emphasis on the human aspect of courage is quite 
probably linked with Plato's rejection of animal courage (Tillich, 
p. 80-81). 
Psychological 
The literature reviewed seems to indicate a definite and wide-
spread attachment to traditional conceptions of courage. This belief in 
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specifically defined modes of demonstrating one's courage may be ex-
plained within the context of several psychological theories. 
Atkin (1971) examined the individual's motivations for parti-
cipating in what he terms the "ritualized behaviour" (p. 579) of the war 
institution. This war institution, he claims, is "ego-syntonic" (p. 561) 
and thus quite acceptable to the individual's morality. Thus, patriotism, 
or the exaltation of one's group, may be viewed as a"legitimate, accept-
able, rationalized displacement of the individual's narcissism" (p. 561). 
He speaks of a "socially determined character formation" (p. 569) where-
in most people will comply with the demands of the state. They will res-
pond readily to orders given by the state. 
The process of identification with one's peers and internaliza-
tion of social ideas and values, Atkin claims, results in the individ-
ual's identification with the values of his culture (p. 572). The resul-
tant conformity is largely unconscious. The individual obeys cultural 
demands with relatively little awareness. 
Atkin's social-psychoanalytic theory and the concept of inter-
nalization could therefore explain the need to express one's courage, or 
to prove one's manhood via specific and perhaps ritualized forms of 
behaviour. He describes this process of internalization as "a restruc-
turing and a synthesis of the social, cultural, and moral ideas into the 
individual's ego...they become a part of the 'me'" (p. 578). Thus the 
need to prove yourself courageous may be an integral and unconscious 
aspect of the social self. Courage, as a cultural value, may reside 
mainly within the unconscious. Courageous behaviour could be likened to 
a social role to which the individual conforms. 
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Traditional courage, especially within the context of war, may 
be primarily a function of conformity. Statements by soldiers that they 
are "only following orders" (p. 73), Charny (1971) claims, indicates a 
definite lack of personal convictions. This may suggest a lack of per-
sonal involvement or conscious self-determination when conforming to 
culturally-defined modes of exhibiting courage. In fact, traditional 
courage may not involve a real decision. Conformity would suggest 
agreement with the majority. Courage within this context may 
simply be the understood or implicit manner of behaving. The emphasis 
placed on courage as being primarily a prescribed response, would seem 
to render traditional courage the status of a relatively "riskless" 
decision. 
Traditional conceptions of courage and its expression in war 
may be understood within the framework of Tomkins' "Ideo-affective reson-
ance theory". Eckhardt and Alcock (1970) were successful in their efforts 
to establish an empirical link between ideology and personality for war/ 
peace attitudes. Their results indicated the following: 
Ideological conservatism at home and militarism abroad were 
largely associated with personal extraversion, which may be 
interpreted as thoughtless conformity or acting without 
thinking. Political cynicism was largely associated with 
neuroticism and social irresponsibility. Both factors shared 
an ideological lack of internationalism and personal misan-
thropy, strict childhood discipline (as recalled) and lack of 
empathy... (p. 109) 
The general factor of "compulsion" was isolated as the underlying explana-
tory value for the link between ideological and personality factors. The 
authors hypothesized that this general value may be culturally determined. 
The "love affair" (p. 105) between the idea (war) and the feel-
ing (courage) may be a matter of values. The underlying value of 
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"compulsion" was defined by Eckhardt and Alcock as "a readiness to use 
force or the threat of force, punishment or the threat of punishment, 
as a means of controlling human behaviour and of resolving conflict 
situations" (p. 107). This might lend support to the assumption that 
courage and its traditional relationships to war and to religious beliefs 
may have their basis in a common value. The correlation of "thoughtless 
conformity or acting without thinking" may lend support to the assump-
tion that traditional courage is primarily response-oriented. The self 
may play only a minor role. 
The concept of "national role" (Katz, 1967, p. 16) and con-
ceptions of "symbolic", "normative" or "instrumental involvement" (p. 17) 
might serve as explanations for the expressed adherence to traditional 
courage. Given that an individual is a formal member of a national sys-
tem, declaration of war, or involvement in a war by the nation would 
necessitate the activation of the national role of "soldier" (Katz, 1967). 
Thus, necessarily placing the role of courage within the context of war 
would imply that courage may also be related to the concept of national 
role. The emphasis on conformity and the consequence for deviancy from 
one's national role is explained by Katz. He states: "As a member of 
the national system, the individual must either assume his national role 
or leave the system. And there are no places to go save prison or exile" 
(p. 16). Traditional courage may therefore be viewed as a necessary by-
product or result of the automatic conformity to or assumption of one's 
national role. 
Katz further defines symbolic attachment to a bureaucratic 
system as "emotionally held attitudes in which the symbols represent 
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absolute values and have a life of their own" (p. 17). An individual 
who views courage or heroism in war not only as a means towards victory • 
but as a value, as an end in itself, could be regarded as having a 
"symbolic attachment" to traditional conceptions of courage. The physi-
cal courage of sports and the honour and fame attributed to sports heroes 
might indicate or imply such a symbolic attachment. Katz suggests that 
such symbolic attachment has its basis in the emotional conditioning of 
children to these symbols. 
Adherence to traditional religious conceptions of courage as a 
patient and persevering attitude towards troubles in life might be ex-
plained by Katz's conception of "normative involvement". He defines this 
as "the acceptance of specific legitimate requirements of the system nec-
essary for system membership" (p. 17). People may not be totally attached 
to religion per se, but they fulfil the requirements of attending church 
and labelling themselves as one sect or another. Official commitments 
may be limited to specific rituals such as the marriage ceremony. The 
general optimism of their lifestyles and the belief that struggles are 
necessary in order to build character (e.g., Moore, 1951) suggests a 
"normative involvement" of sorts. People may adhere to traditional relig-
ious norms without symbolic attachments to the symbols of church and for-
mal religion. With regards to courage and war, normative attachment 
would describe the man who may not totally agree with the war but serves 
his time regardless. Glasser (1971) comments in 365 Days: 
If they had to they'd go again and again. It wasn't because 
they wanted to or even believed in what they were doing, but 
because they were there and someone told them to do it. 
Strange war. Going for something they didn't believe in or 
for that matter didn't care about, just to make it 365 days 
and be done with it. (p. 26) 
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A Basic Explanatory Model 
The S R or Traditional Model 
Within the framework of this model, primary emphasis is placed 
on the Response, the courageous action. Physical courage, as demonstrat-
ed on the battlefield or the sports arena, in addition to a blind adher-
ence to a religious normative lifestyle, may be explained within the 
framework of the traditional model. Psychoanalytic theory suggests that 
adherence to this model may be largely unconscious. Social-psychological 
theories explain the traditional model in terms of conformity behaviour. 
Implicit in conformity to traditional conceptions of courage 
are positive reinforcements such as being labelled a "hero" or "coura-
geous", having your overt behaviour viewed as "right" or "good" and 
generally being accepted by the social majority. The exemplar of this 
model may take few genuine risks with respect to social behaviour. He 
is courageous because he is a carbon copy of what society would like him 
to be. 
A Schematic Summary 
Stimulus (external to the Response (a socially pre-
individual) scribed overt behaviour) 
e.g., war, sports, hard- e.g., obey the draft, be a 
ships in life champion, patient 
perseverance, etc. 
Origin: primarily external, i.e., social class, race, God, 
religion 
Operational Definitions: to remain with your Company, your team 
or at your post at all costs, and to 
the dire end 
Contemporary Illustrations of the Traditional Model 
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In newspapers we read frequently of people being awarded 
metals for their heroism. The following was noted in the K-W Record 
(Thursday, July 6, 1972): 
Five Canadians, three from New Brunswick and two from 
Ontario, have been awarded bronze medals for heroism in 
saving lives, the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission announced 
Wednesday. 
This suggests that courage might also be explained within the framework 
of prosocial behaviour or altruism. 
In the land of the Israelis, the Pillar of Heroism firmly 
attests to the traditional conception of courage: 
a simple severe triangular shaft of stainless steel which 
rises 70 feet high on this Judean Hill. Deeds of Jewish 
valor are carved into the surrounding stones. (Golden, p. 83) 
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COURAGE AND SURVIVAL 
Traditional conceptions of courage conspicuously minimize the 
role of the inner self, or the personal involvement aspect of courage. 
References to courage within the context of survival, to the contrary, 
appear to place considerable emphasis on the central role of a strong 
self, a hopeful attitude and the maintenance of dignity and autonomy in 
life-threatening situations. Emphasis on the conscious and purposeful 
nature of courage (Frankl, 1963; Bettleheim, 1960), the concept of self-
reliance (Frank, 1952; Schnabel, 1958; Leboucher, 1969; Munden, 1973; 
Brantner, 1971; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1973), and the necessity of inter-
acting with others (Pawlowlcz, 1962), suggests that courage may be a 
more complex psychological process than traditional conceptions would 
imply. 
Frequent references are made to the concept of hope by all of 
the above authors. The resultant confusion as to the relationship be-
ween courage and hope further complicates any attempts to define courage 
adequately within the context of survival. The great variety of survival 
situations and discussions of the multitude of coping mechanisms found 
therein (Noyce, 1962; Evans & Cody, 1969; Hansell, 1970; Bloch, 1969, 
1970; Chodoff, 1970; Glassman & Siegel, 1970; Hinton, 1973; Lilly, 1956; 
Colbach, 1971), also suggests the need for a more adequate definition 
of courage and its specific role in survival and other stressful situa-
tions . 
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Frankl (1963), on the basis of his experience in a concentra-
tion camp, spoke of the courage to suffer. He described this courage as 
an attitude, a state of mind and a choice. Of primary importance was 
the manner in which one survived the ordeal of the concentration camps. 
Frankl emphasized the ultimate decision each individual could make in 
accepting suffering and the probability of death in a dignified and hope-
ful manner. 
Speaking of the necessity of a sense of humour for survival 
(Frankl, 1963) suggests that some basic personality pre-dispositions may 
also be essential. One might conceive of "humour" as a mediating vari-
able which may serve to explain the existence of courage and hence the 
survival of some individuals. "A sense of humour", Frankl remarked "was 
another of the soul's weapons in the fight for self-preservation" (p. 68). 
It provided a brief spell of freedom from suffering. 
The ability to choose one's attitude in any given situation, 
Frankl claimed, comprises man's ultimate freedom. Thus, the decision to 
live or die in the concentration camp and the subsequent maintenance of 
personal dignity, resides ultimately within man himself. The decision 
to cope with one's situation in a hopeful frame of mind does much to 
strengthen one's physical and mental endurance capabilities. Thus, im-
plicit in the courage to suffer is not only the endurance and persever-
ance found in traditional conceptions of courage, but, a more basic self-
determination . 
The general hopelessness of the concentration camp and the 
constant presence of death, led many to entertain thoughts of suicide. 
In order to survive, it was necessary to maintain a belief in the future 
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and never to lose hope. Implicit in hopelessness was the ultimate 
suicide of the "Moslems". They were not merely apathetic and hardened 
emotionally to their environment, as were the majority. Rather, Frankl 
described them as completely lifeless and without hope. They were mere 
shells of the beings they once were and had ceased to react even to the 
basic necessities of life. 
Suffering was regarded by Frankl as an intricate and meaningful 
aspect of life. The decision to suffer courageously, and to die with 
dignity if necessary, is presented almost as an imperative. Frankl 
states: "They must not lose hope but should keep their courage in the 
certainty that the hopelessness of their struggle did not detract from 
its dignity and its meaning" (p. 130). 
Basic to Frankl's notion of successfully maintaining hope and 
courage is a strong sense of optimism and future time perspective. "It 
is a peculiarity of man", Frankl claims, "that he can only live by look-
ing to the future" (p. 115). Any man who loses faith in the future is 
doomed. It is this belief in the future, and man's striving towards some 
goal, which gives man his inner strength, his capacity to endure. 
In the concentration camps, some men began to suffer from what 
Frankl termed a "deformed inner time" (p. 112). They began to live from 
day to day, totally in the present. They ceased setting future goals 
and looked retrospectively into the past for comfort. Others began to 
concentrate exclusively on the past. This provided them with a source 
of relief. The danger inherent in this mode of coping was that they 
overlooked the reality of their situation and missed the opportunity to 
grow spiritually and experience something positive from their ordeal. 
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The false hopes maintained by some optimists was equally as destructive. 
Some would set a date for their liberation or remain convinced that they 
would be home again for Christmas. Nonfulfilment of such false hopes 
resulted in a loss of courage and subsequent suicide. 
Frankl clearly emphasizes the important role of the self in 
maintaining courage. He fails, however, to clearly define the inter-
action, or to distinguish, should that be the case, between courage and 
hope. Both appear to be necessary for survival and the establishment of 
a purpose, a future goal, in one's life, even if that life is filled 
with suffering. Frankl states: 
Those who know how close the connection is between the state 
of mind of a man - his courage and hope, or lack of them -
and state of immunity of his body will understand that the 
sudden loss of hope and courage can have a deadly effect. 
(p. 120) 
Also, both courage and hope appear to stem from a belief in the future 
and a personal decision to render one's present suffering as somewhat 
meaningful. This confusion leads one to wonder whether courage and hope 
are not one and the same. 
Bettleheim (1960) spoke of the concentration camp as a de-
humanizing situation. His conception of courage emphasizes the necessity 
of actively maintaining a strong, independent, dignified and psychologi-
cally autonomous self. Courage involves the conscious decision to main-
tain one's self-respect. Bettleheim's emphasis on the self-determined 
aspect of courage is very similar to Frankl (1963). From a strong self 
will arise the courage to face the reality of one's situation, however 
grim it may be. The key to survival was to "join reason with the heart", 
to decide that one was going to maintain his personal integrity. 
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Bettleheim's conception of courage and survival in the con-
centration camp situation adds to the basic distinction made by Meerloo 
(1944) between the courage to live and the courage to die. Bettleheim 
claims that a dignified death, wherein the life of the personality is 
retained, is far superior qualitatively to the undignified death of those 
"Moslems" whose already dead personalities constituted virtual suicide. 
Pioneer contributions of psychologists described the courage 
to live as merely a preferred value. This value, in turn, led to the 
specific response of living as opposed to dying in battle. Bettleheim, 
in discussing the courage to live within the context of extreme survival 
situations, stresses the role of the self. Emphasis is placed on the 
psychological process of choosing life over death and assuming a digni-
fied courage. One readily risks the probability of physical death in 
order to ensure the psychological life of the personality. Courage in-
volves the maintenance of some semblance of independence in the midst of 
control. 
Again, as in Frankl (1963), endurance and perseverance involve 
much more than simply remaining in the situation. In fact, defying the 
authoritarian control of their captors by attempting to escape from the 
camp, was indicative of courage. It was a sign that the personality was 
still alive. Implicit in courage is the execution of a conscious deci-
sion to survive psychologically, at all costs. 
The importance of self-reliance in producing and sustaining 
the necessary courage to withstand the stress of war is exemplified in 
the story of Anne Frank (1952). She was constantly striving to increase 
her inner strength through her own efforts. Anne felt that she must be-
come good through her own efforts without examples and without good advice. 
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Then, later she would be a stronger individual. She renewed and 
strengthened her courage by writing and continuously telling herself: 
"I must, I must, I must" be brave (p. 177). Anne felt the need to grow 
in spite of her restricted confinement. She was aware of the need to be 
strong, to be brave and to never give up. All this she felt was depen-
dent on her own self. Anne stated: "alone I had to face the difficult 
task of changing myself" (p. 155). 
The importance of self-reliance in coping with stress is also 
emphasized in areas where courage is popularly ascribed the leading role. 
Quarantelli and Dynes (1973) state that self-reliance and the ability to 
cope with a disaster situation are more prevalent than is generally real-
ized. Relief agencies and outside assistance, except for cases where 
specialized equipment or medical care is necessary, are not a central 
requirement. Heroism in disaster situations is not as dramatic as people 
imagine it to be. In spite of these facts, traditional conceptions of 
courage are still the ideal. An example provided by Quarantelli & Dynes 
is the undue stress placed on the superhuman efforts of a particular 
person in a rescue operation. The authors found it ironic that disaster 
victims were usually the first to believe such dramatic accounts of their 
suffering and heroism. They took pride in thinking of their own exper-
ience as typical and heroic. 
Quarantelli & Dynes conclude with the thought that perhaps 
heroism is not the wrong word to describe disaster behaviour. Their con-
ception of courage, however, involves much more than the ideal, over-
publicized, and perhaps mis-represented notion of heroism in disaster 
situations. Their definition of courage involves a quiet determination, 
practical forethought, and a self-reliant coping with stress. 
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The central role of the self in courage is also noted by 
Munden (1973). Courage he feels, belongs within the realm of the psy-
chologically healthy individual. He presents the interesting view that 
"mental illness is an expression of individual cowardice" (p. 71). 
Courage and hence mental health, must be freely chosen. He confuses the 
issue somewhat by introducing the concept of hope. Those patients who 
undergo positive personality changes, he claims, "do so out of despair... 
the fear of losing all hope in life" (p. 70). Thus, one wonders whether 
the basic mechanism for psychological survival is a self-determined 
choice of courage or a fear of losing hope. 
In addition to the seeming interchangeability of courage and 
hope, accounts of courage and survival introduce another source of con-
fusion. Frequent reference is made to the role of an other, an external 
aid or influence, in the maintenance of courage and/or hope in times of 
stress. 
Sala Pawlowicz (1962) attributes her ultimate survival of the 
concentration camp experience to the renewed strength and hope which 
another's caring produced. Her own courage and active hopes for the 
future seemed almost totally depleted. All hope seemed gone and Sala 
found herself simply surviving from moment to moment. She blotted out 
the past because it hurt too much to remember. She did not think of the 
future because it seemed that there was no longer any hope for a future. 
Sheer endurance and survival in the present were her modes of coping. 
In the midst of this hopelessness and of ultimate fatalism, 
she found a renewed sense of worth, of being, and a renewed courage. A 
stranger had left her a message, carefully concealed, a small crust of 
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black bread, a symbol of hope. This in turn gave her the will to endure 
and the courage to defy. She no longer felt alone. 
Of note is the fact that Sala attributed the source of this 
renwed courage and hope not to her secret benefactor, but to God, a 
Divine source. She remarked: "At just the right time Divine Will had 
intervened. I prayed to have the strength to bear the burden of respons-
ibility that this note had placed upon me. I could not lose myself..." 
(p. 142). Careful analysis of the environmental conditions surrounding 
her may provide a clue. 
Sala experienced her oppressors as being totally bent on des-
truction. She herself was experiencing a slow yielding to this destruc-
tive force. Her self-image as a human being, one with dignity, self-
respect and freedom to determine her own destiny, was slowly being under-
mined. Sala states: 
I reflected that my degradation was probably exactly what 
the Nazis wanted. The hunger, humiliation and constant 
beatings made us begin to believe that we actually were 
sub-human. We had no human rights, and were treated like 
so many animals. With the loss of dignity, came the loss 
of a will to live. We behaved like sheep, I thought, 
because we had lost the sense of pride and dignity that 
normal people had. The Nazis seemed to control our lives 
so completely that there was never any hope of escape. 
(Pawlowicz, p. 146) 
Attributing her renewed courage and hope to a human source was not pos-
sible. The Nazis were no longer regarded as human and the self-image of 
the Jews also approached that of being sub-human. 
This confusing definition of courage and hope as both primarily 
self and other determined is also found in other accounts of concentra-
tion camp and war experiences (Frank, 1952; Leboucher, 1969). Both inner 
determination and the resolution to help a loved one provided the necessary 
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strength for Mme. Leboucher. Father Benoit's formula of "work and pray" 
(p. 27, Leboucher) also seems to place equal emphasis on the role of God 
and man as sources of inner courage and hope. Anne Frank, who placed 
such great emphasis on self-reliance, also is noted as saying: "We 
stayed together - that much good fortune we still had. Perhaps that is 
why we endured longer than the others who were all alone...we now began 
to see that misery is not doubled when it is shared" (Schnabel, 1958, 
p. 164). 
To further complicate the issue, Bettleheim (1960) claims that 
the attempt made by the Frank's to remain together in such abnormal cir-
cumstances resulted in their deaths. He feels they made a mistake in 
attempting to continue life as normal. Anne's death followed shortly 
after her sister Margot's in the concentration camp. 
Issues of survival from a slightly different perspective 
(Hinton, J. "Bearing Cancer", 1973; & Brantner, J. P., "Death and the 
Self", 1971) also make reference to courage and hope, self-reliance and 
the necessity of others. Hinton views courage and hope as one of the 
many factors which contribute to a person's ability to cope with cancer. 
Approximately one-third reacted to the diagnosis of cancer by maintaining 
hope and striving towards establishing limited goals towards independence. 
The rest spoke of "acceptance" or "despondence" and some chose to com-
pletely ignore their burden. Hinton speaks vaguely of patients bearing 
the experience with a "quieter courage". One gains the vague impression 
that perhaps courage and hope, as modes of coping with a possibly ter-
minal illness, may be somewhat superior qualitatively to other modes of 
coping. 
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Brantner maintains that certain attitudes may promote survival 
and could, in some instance, prolong life. He quotes Troebst with res-
pect to disaster and emergency situations and states that survivors more 
often considered the possibility of a disaster in advance. They were 
also quite prepared to do something about their situation. Thus, cogni-
tive forethought and subsequent self-reliant action appear to character-
ize courage. Of the survivors, Brantner states: "they refuse to let 
themselves be depressed or discouraged or hopeless or despairing" (p. 22). 
Brantner also predicted that the presence of certain conditions 
in women with non-cancerous pap smears would result in cancer of the cer-
vix. "Hopelessness" as well as "recent death or separation" were among 
the variables. His predictions distinguishing those who developed cancer 
from patients who remained in good health were approximately 75% accurate. 
Thus,hope and the presence of another person may be central for survival. 
Brantner refers to hopelessness and discouragement as dangerous 
conditions which can be dealt with and overcome "by our own efforts and 
with the help of professional people" (p. 24). The development of the 
self, he feels, should be our main goal in life, and "this is accomplish-
ed only in relationships with other persons" (p. 25). His comment that 
"hope is necessary for life" (p. 24) does little to clarify the defini-
tional dilemma. 
Courage and Hope 
To differentiate courage and hope seems a difficult yet neces-
sary task. Hope more often appears to designate a mental disposition or 
attitude. This is somewhat confusing, since courage has also been de-
fined as a mental attitude by many of the authors mentioned. The 
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difference, however, appears to lie in the action component which 
appears necessary in order to distinguish courage as such. 
Hope does not necessarily require action to demonstrate to 
others that it exists. Take the example: "I hope I have the courage 
to go back". One could spend the rest of one's life hoping and due to 
unmitigating circumstances, never actually return. Yet, actually going 
back would demonstrate that one had the courage to do so. Similarly, 
public voicing of one's opinions would demonstrate that one had the cour-
age to act on one's convictions. It would demonstrate that one really 
wanted to be a part of change rather than merely hoping that someday 
things would be different. Courage implies committing oneself to action 
whereas hope may serve as an attitude which sustains that courage. 
Hope also appears to be more of an intensely personal phenome-
non whereas courage frequently appears to involve others. For example, 
a person may hope to be wealthy someday. While this hope may indeed 
require action on his part in order to materialize, it need not neces-
sarily be verified or publically observed by others in order to be termed 
as a hope. Courage is more other oriented, more external. For example, 
actions such as jumping into a river to save a drowning child, or voicing 
one's opinions publically, are often labelled as "courageous". Courage 
implies publically observable actions. A person can hope, and no one 
need agree with him in order for him to be certain that he is indeed 
hoping for something. Yet, in order to believe that he is courageous, 
it is necessary for him to conform to others' conceptions of heroism and 
hope to merit the label. Courage appears to require public support. 
Hope appears to require only private, personal support. 
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A further distinction stems from the above. Due to the seem-
ingly private nature of hoping, one could hope theoretically for any-
thing one wished. It would still be termed a hope. Yet, due perhaps 
to the public nature of courage, only certain prescribed actions are 
generally labelled as courageous. Heroic actions in war or disaster 
situations are an example. Other behaviours, such as draft-resistance, 
might not be considered courageous by the prevailing majority. Society 
has created the label of "coward" for such deviance. 
Fromm, in speaking of courage and hope (1968) stressed the 
importance of activity in both courage and hope. He conceived of passi-
vity as pathological. Hope and courage thus appear closely linked and 
related to change and action in the world. Passive hope, where nothing 
is done, says Fromm, constitutes no hope. What is needed is an active 
hope and an active courage, since courage is regarded by Fromm as being 
the necessary component to life. 
Personal accounts of concentration camp experiences readily 
illustrate the distinction between passive and active hope. Sheer endur-
ance in the present, while still maintaining some small semblance of a 
will to live, with minimal reliance on the past or future, could be view-
ed as passive hope. An active hope, in view of its future-orientation, 
goes beyond simple physical endurance. 
This conception of time perspective again creates a distinction 
between courage and hope. Hope appears to involve a more limited and 
narrow time span than courage. Active hope has a well defined future 
orientation. Passive hope centers mainly on the present. Courage encom-
passes a wider time span. It incorporates past, present and/or future 
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time perspectives, as the situations require. Courage can draw the 
future into the present by realizing hopes. Courage can project the 
present into the future, in terms of actualizing potentialities, in act-
ing out hopes. Also, courage can create a past, figuratively speaking, 
by concretizing memories through action in the present (Frankl, 1963). 
Hopelessness appears to entail ending the struggle for life 
in the midst of stress or suffering. Giving up hope may be a type of 
suicide. Courage also appears to be implicitly involved in the mainten-
ance of both life and hope in survival situations. Hope, a more private 
phenomenon, at once sustains courage and appears to be bolstered by it. 
The two concepts may be better viewed as exemplifying an inter-dependent 
rather than an independent relationship. They both appear basic to the 
continuing life process. The distinction between courage and hope may 
be more legitimately expressed on the basis of emphasized origin, that 
is, external or other, versus internal or the self. 
The following theoretical model may illustrate more clearly 
the above conceptions: 
Courage-Hope Model 
Other Self 
Hope^ ;> Courage 
Solid Lines: These denote the necessary links in the model. They ex-
emplify the important factors for ultimate survival and the existence of 
courage and/or hope. 
Broken Lines: These denote sufficient but not necessary links in the 
model. These factors, while important, are secondary. They are always 
present to some extent. This stems from the fact that we can be autonomous 
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individuals, but only in a relative sense, since we can never be 
totally isolated from others. Their influence is not of primary impor-
tance for maintaining courage and/or hope. 
Changing the secondary link between Other and Courage to a 
solid line, or a necessary condition would exemplify traditional concep-
tions of courage. Relegating to the Other a position of primary import-
ance would clearly indicate the necessity of conformity behaviour. 
Relegating primary importance to the Other with respect to hope 
implies not conformity but the presence of the necessary support or in-
centive crucial to hope. In order for hope to be active, and hence non-
pathological and constructive, it requires a link with the outside world. 
Given this link, it can actively support courage. The notion of personal 
responsibility to sustain this courage through a basic hope and self-
reliance completes the cycle. 
Maintaining a weak link between hope and the other, and strength-
ening the link between self and hope would only serve to isolate the in-
dividual. Such a configuration would merely strengthen the already pri-
vate nature of hope and reduce contact with the outside world. The con-
ceptions of courage, survival and mental health would apply here. 
Alternative Explanations of Coping in Survival Situations 
Discussion of the role courage and hope play in coping in sur-
vival and stressful situations have centered generally upon the necessity 
for maintaining a basic will to live. There are, however, studies rang-
ing across the same survival categories (i.e., mental and physical health, 
the stress of war and concentration camps) which make no mention of cour-
age or hope as primary coping mechanisms. 
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Evans and Cody (1969) and Hansell (1970) discuss coping with 
stress in the field of mental health. The technique of decision coun-
selling is primarily a cognitive approach. Immediate intervention by 
professional counsellors and treatment within the crisis situation where 
possible is the ideal approach. Stress is placed on carefully assessing 
the crisis situation and teaching new problem-solving skills to the 
patient. Allowing the patient to remain within his normal environment 
and employing those already interacting with him in his problem-solving 
task, the authors feel will enhance his sense of dignity. 
Psychological survival, as described above, appears to be 
primarily dependent upon the individual's capacity to learn new coping 
techniques. Both the expectation of others that he will succeed and the 
specific coping mechanisms taught are external to the individual. Self-
reliance and courage does not really appear central in decision counsel-
ling. Even personal hope appears subsumed under others' expectations 
of success. 
Considerable attention has been given to the soldier's adapta-
tion to the stress of war. Bourne (1970) maintains that "A state of 
psychological and even physiological homeostatis can be maintained des-
pite repeated exposure to objectively high-risk situations" (p. 186). 
Extensive psychological defenses, rather than courage or hope, are pro-
vided as explanations for survival. Bourne includes factors such as 
religious beliefs, and careful cognitive calculation of the risk involved, 
as being characteristic of survivors. The mention of "independent, self-
reliant individuals with inordinate faith in their own abilities" (p. 186) 
seems to approach the definition of courage thus far evolved in this 
paper. 
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Bourne claims that the symptoms exhibited by soldiers or their 
particular modes of coping are not of primary concern. Of importance is 
the end result. Bourne states: "to a certain extent the actual present-
ing symptoms became irrelevant: the critical issue is whether or not 
the man has ceased to cope with or function in the environment of the 
combat zone" (p. 187). 
Treatment of psychiatric casualties within the war zone center-
ed upon the concepts of "immediacy, proximity and expectancy" (Bloch, 
1969; Hayes, 1969). The use of drugs such as marijuana as a coping de-
vice (Colbach, 1971) was viewed as being of minimal concern since it had 
not yet presented itself as a pressing problem in combat. 
The efforts expended to keep the soldier in battle very clear-
ly exemplify traditional conceptions of courage. Discussion of how the 
individual soldier copes with the stress of war seems to indicate a need 
for a qualitative distinction with respect to the courage of those who 
externally fit the traditional definition. 
Bloch (1970) in discussing the adaptation, psychologically, of 
normal individuals during a term in Viet Nam indicates that fears of 
death and injury were predominant. In cases where a man's ability to 
cope with these fears is questionable, Bloch states: "the quality of his 
relationship with his peer group can often be the determining factor in 
whether he 'makes it' (functions effectively) or doesn't" (p. 620). 
Due to the nature of the Viet Nam tour, however, such group 
cohesiveness or support is not as strong as it was in previous wars. A 
soldier knows that in 365 Days his time is up. Thus he concentrates on 
maintaining ties at home and does not become as closely affiliated to his 
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combat group. One might predict, on the basis of the postulated theor-
etical courage-hope model (p. 62), the quality of an individual's adjust-
ment in war. 
Given lower group cohesiveness, one might expect that the per-
son who copes best might be high in self-reliance. This would foster a 
self-determined courage to survive. The necessary hope, to sustain this 
courage, can readily be satisfied through relatively tenuous or infre-
quent emotional support from significant others. These others may be 
loved ones at home. In order to sustain an adequate level of hope, it 
might also be predicted that the individual has a relatively low Need 
for Affiliation (N-Aff.). In World War II, where time to be spent in 
combat was indefinite, and hence, attachment to one's group more important, 
other factors may have been primary. In the latter situation, a high 
N-Affillation might have provided the necessary hope for survival. The 
highly self-reliant individual, in such a situation, isolated both from 
home and immediate affiliation with his peers, might experience minimal 
hope and hence the faltering of courage. 
Thus, the theoretical courage-hope model, a careful examination 
of situational variables and measures of self-reliance and N-Aff. com-
bined, might provide a fairly accurate prediction of a person's survival 
potential. 
Psychological adaptation to extreme stress as experienced in 
the concentration camps was examined by Chodoff (1970). He indicated 
that a person's basic personality strengths and weaknesses play a major 
role in subsequent adaptation to the post-war period. With respect to 
immediate survival within the camps, Chodoff maintains both that he has 
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no real answers and that defense mechanisms played a major role. He 
claims that chance and the "adaptability of the human species" (p. 82) 
accounted for life or death in the camps. The primary defense mechanisms 
were apathy, denial and isolation of affect. 
Chodoff makes no mention of courage and refers to hope only 
indirectly. He relegates the post-^ war "concentration camp syndrome" 
(p. 84) with its characteristic psychological problems, in part to "the 
disappointment of their idealistic hopes that a better world would now 
arise" (p. 83). This may imply that hope and courage could be relevant 
variables to investigate, even though they are not directly mentioned as 
primary adaptive factors. 
The courage of those in the concentration camps often indicated 
a high degree of self-reliance. Also, while some affiliation with an 
other was necessary for survival, to provide hope, too great an attach-
ment resulted in death. Chodoff states: "some form of companionship 
with others was indispensable, since a completely isolated individual 
could not have survived in the camps, but the depth of such companion-
ship was usually limited by the overpowering egotistical demands of self-
preservation" (p. 83). 
Again, on the basis of the courage-hope model, it might be 
assumed that given extreme stress situations, a high N-Affiliation could 
prove destructive. It may produce a hope which is overly dependent on 
the physical closeness of others. In situations of extreme stress or 
isolation from others, mere knowledge that the other exists should be 
sufficient to provide the necessary degree of hope. A high degree of 
self-reliance in turn, would lead to the courage needed for survival. 
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Accounts of isolated individuals struggling for survival 
(Noyce, 1962) suggests that in the absence of a living companion, as in 
the case of Tiiro, a stranded sailor, the person will create such a 
presence. Tiiro had been lost at sea for approximately thirty days. 
His partner, Ericson, was dead and lying in the raft. Thus, in situa-
tions of extreme stress and isolation, where a person is unable to per-
sonally contribute significantly to his ultimate survival, he may project 
his need for another and sense it as a presence. This projected presence 
might in turn, provide the necessary hope to sustain the courage derived 
from his own self-reliance. Thus, a mere desire for an other may be 
sufficient to sustain the will to live. 
Experimental support for the above contentions may be obtained 
from a study of isolation and its effects on the individual (Lilly, 1956). 
On the basis of autobiographical studies of isolation, Lilly concluded 
that all survivors possess the inner conviction that they will live. 
Another equally important factor for some is the knowledge that others 
are attempting to rescue them. Hallucinations and delusions are quite 
characteristic of strong egos who survive. These hallucinations appear 
to reflect their will to live. He refers both to "destroyer type" and 
"saviour type" hallucinations. Lilly hypothesized that the brain remains 
active in such stress situations. Instead of remaining reality-bound, 
the brain is left free to fantasize and experience hallucinations. 
In his isolation study the absolute intensity of stimulation 
was reduced by submerging S in a tank of warm and even-flowing water. 
The longest exposure for each of the 2 Ss in the experiment was 3 hours. 
They were instructed to inhibit movement and report their experiences 
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immediately after the experiment. Results indicated experiences simi-
lar to real life situations. If a person is alone long enough and if 
the level of physical and human stimulation is low enough, the mind turns 
inward and projects outward its own contents and processes. The brain, 
Lilly concludes, remains active. Lilly states that even healthy minds 
act in this manner when experiencing the stress of isolation. 
A Learning Theory Explanation 
Mowrer (1960) presents an experimental analogue of courage 
which might serve as an explanatory basis for traditional (S-R) concep-
tions of courage and courage in survival situations. Mowrer employed 
rats as Ss and a maze apparatus with an electrical grid on the runway. 
Electrical shock, a painful stimulus, was the barrier to the reinforce-
ment or goal at the end of the maze. 
Courage is defined by Mowrer as an acquired characteristic. 
Describing behaviour as either cowardly or courageous is a function of 
how the opposing forces in a conflict situation are balanced. These 
opposing forces are defined by Mowrer as being fear and hope. This bal-
ance of fear and hope is described by Mowrer as follows: 
If much fear and little hope are associated with stimuli 
which a given action produces then, with respect to that 
action, the individual is "timid", "cowardly". 
If little fear and much hope are associated with stimuli 
which a given action produces then the action will be 
boldly executed, (pp. 434-435) 
Mowrer cites experiments by Muenzinger (1936; 1952; 1954; 1957) which 
indicate that at times punishment of a correct response may lead to marked 
facilitation in learning. Some groups of Ss (rats) continued to choose 
the alley marked "fear coming" after having crossed the electrical grid. 
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Although not attributing the term "courage" to rats, Mowrer claims that 
such behaviour in humans would be called courage. He postulates that 
courage may simply be the absence of fear in situations where it might 
well be expected to be present. 
Traditional conceptions of courage popularly define stressful 
situations such as going to war or participating in competitive sports 
as tests of one's courage and demonstrations of manhood. The possibility 
of death or physical maiming when undergoing such feats might be defined 
as painful stimuli. The ideal of the fearless soldier, however, indi-
cates that fear will be minimal. The courageous person, in the tradi-
tional sense, is one who through will power (Moran, 1945) and conscious 
expectation (Slim, 1957) always has his fear in control. Thus, the 
psychological set is to endure the necessary pain associated with actions 
designed to achieve the ultimate goal of manhood. Mowrer might define 
war as a painful stimulus which is associated with a high degree of hope 
and little fear. Inherent in the resultant goal-seeking behaviour is a 
strong sense of determinism. Learning theory and the balance of forces 
in a conflict situation (a balance which is in this case, socially pres-
cribed) replaces the vague and unscientific religious, climatic and 
ethical determination of popular writers. 
Mowrer also introduces the concept of "effort" and perseverance 
as an important aspect in overcoming painful barriers to a goal. He 
gives the example of placing a rat in a Skinner box and setting the ratio 
of bar presses to food pellets (positive reinforcement or goal) at 200:1. 
Mowrer states that, given such experimental conditions, the rat would 
probably die. However, setting the ratio initially at 20:1 and then 
gradually increasing the required bar presses (or effort) would result 
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in continued effort and increased output for the reward. Mowrer claims 
that such a conception of survival would broaden the psychology of work, 
sacrifice and character. Intermittant as opposed to continuous reinforce-
ment should allow for greater resistance to extinction of the learned 
response and hence, greater survival potential. 
The conception of courage by traditional religious writers 
(e.g., Moore, 1951) as the passive endurance of the necessary hardships 
and difficulties in life could readily be explained within Mowrer's 
learning theory framework. The constant temptations with which a Chris-
tian is confronted and general misfortunes of life could be defined as 
painful stimuli. The good Christian is psychologically prepared to ex-
pect such hardships and to expend the necessary efforts enduring them. 
Such behaviour is linked to the hope of salvation. Good luck or success 
in life could be defined as intermittant reinforcement, since the general 
belief would be that life is a struggle. The emphasis on optimism would 
allow for a "low fear" definition of the situation. The gradual exposure 
to the harshness of reality provided for children in North American 
society would explain survival amidst such difficult conditions as life 
provides. 
Learning theory analogues of courage and survival do not fit 
as well with the conceptions of courage and survival presented in this 
paper. The constant danger and actual presence of death and suffering 
in the concentration camps (the painful stimulus) presents some diffi-
culty in assuming that this was a "low fear" and "high hope" condition. 
The presence of false hope or optimism in some and their eventual suicide 
when these hopes (e.g., freedom and an end to the holocaust at Christmas) 
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were not realized cannot be readily explained by Mowrer's model. These 
false hopes were obviously not conditioned to the endurance of pain 
associated with survival in the camps. Their hopes were conditioned to 
the reoccurrence of a familiar event, such as Christmas or re-uniting 
with their family. 
The notion of gradual habituation to the requirement of in-
creased effort for one's reinforcements also presents a problem. Although 
the existence of prejudice against the Jews may be perceived as a gradual 
conditioning to a courageous endurance of pain the exposure to severe 
conditions in the concentration camps might be considered a fairly sudden 
occurrence. Still, the victims of the holocaust did not all lose hope 
and die immediately. 
The distinction between psychological life and physical sur-
vival posited by Bettleheim (1960) and the value placed on risking the 
latter in order to preserve one's self-respect and autonomy implies free-
dom of choice. Frankl (1962) considered this choice, of life over death, 
an ultimate one belonging to man. Thus, instead of Mowrer*s postulated 
balance of hope and fear explaining survival in the camps, the concept 
of a necessary and ultimate choice, or decision-making, serves as an ex-
planatory basis. The notion of exercising one's freedom suggests that a 
less highly deterministic model would be more appropriate. 
Mowrer cites Brown (1955) who states that all goal-seeking 
behaviour involves a detour through pain to some extent. This pain may 
be interpreted as effort, apprehension and so forth. Confusion arises 
when the "punishment" is large and obvious while the rewards are suble 
and obscure. 
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Traditional conceptions of courage could readily be described 
by the condition where an individual's goal is known and socially ap-
proved. That is, suffering the physical stress involved in competitive 
sports is acknowledged as a rite de passage to manhood. Thus, the osten-
sible reward rather than punishment by pain which is experienced by the 
individual, is not defined as "masochism" or pathological. Rather, one 
speaks of "determination", "persistance" and "gumption" (Mowrer, p. 436). 
The punishment suffered by some new culture adherents could be 
defined as fairly severe (e.g., imprisonment, large fines, future finan-
cial insecurity). The goal, however, is covert, e.g., realizing one's 
ideals. The goal of societal change may be threatening and could tech-
nically be defined as being non-approved. The rewards for activists, 
e.g., inner satisfaction, remain obscure to most onlookers. Thus, draft-
resistors are characterized as "cowards" and deserving of the punishment 
they receive. The following letter was received by Osborne (I Refuse, 
1971): 
Your kind of chickenhearted scum is what makes America look 
ugly. Just a prison sentence is too good for you. You and 
your kind should be put before a firing squad, just like all 
traitors should be. No one who calls himself a Christian 
would even want to look at you. The Christian is a guy who 
will gladly kill any Communist or foreign enemy to protect 
his country. You're probably a foreigner yourself. I hope 
you get it good. (p. 27) 
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CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF COURAGE 
Although psychological literature indicates the need for a 
changed conception of courage (Mack, 1969; Markowltz, 1971; Kincaid & 
Kincaid, 1971), a clearly defined and contemporaneous conception of 
courage is still conspicuously absent. Concomitant with assertions that 
courage should be removed from the realm of warfare and the heroic feats 
therein are studies which attest to the enduring cultural value of hero-
ism (Ermalinski, 1972) and the need to prove one's manhood through per-
sonal physical risk (Moore, 1972). 
Mack (1969), in his discussion of the "hero", T. E. Lawrence, 
states: "In Lawrence's case we are concerned with such intangibles as 
shifting conceptions of heroism" (p. 121). Mack scorns the persistance 
of the British in glorifying the image of the "romantic hero" (p. 119) 
as a personally uninvolved and mythically staunch individual. Mack em-
phasizes the role of important psychological factors in determining 
resultant heroic action. In Lawrence's case, Mack states that heroism 
was primarily a function of his need for an increased self-regard. He 
interprets Lawrence's heroism in psychoanalytic terms as a "displacement" 
(p. 126). By helping others, Lawrence enhanced his own self-esteem. 
Aside from stressing the importance of the personal involve-
ment of an individual, Mack provides no further definitions of heroism. 
Mack does state definitely that the glory and glamour attached to mili-
tary heroism is outmoded. Only a vague conception of this "shifting 
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conception of heroism" (p. 127) is provided. Psychological involvement, 
responsibility for resultant public actions and the notion that courage 
may involve ethics are the only clues provided by Mack. 
Markowltz (1971) links the need for a new conception of cour-
age to personal integrity, belief systems and the pursuit of peace. He 
claims that peace is an impossiblity as long as men continue to believe 
that "traits developed in war are desirable and that only in war does 
man exhibit true courage and deserve the highest medals of honour" (p. 448). 
He states that the altruistic acts of heroism in war are at best only a 
public relations stance. Inhumanity to others in war has been aggrand-
ized as an indication of "stamina and conviction" (p. 445). Also, social 
value has been attached to the masochism of the soldier and the ethics 
of competition and warfare. Markowltz comments: 
Recklessness and compulsive martyrdom are not courage. 
True courage is based on integrity of belief and on the 
willingness to be flexible in these beliefs, to expose 
beliefs to criticism and to change them as necessity 
requires. Formalized thinking diminishes integrity and 
in consequence discourages courageous activity. The Yes 
Man, often praised for courage in warfare, would in many 
civilian situations be scorned for cowardice, (p. 443-444) 
Kincaid and Kincaid (1971) stress the necessity of counselling 
for the purpose of peace. No counsellor, they claim, would encourage a 
person to commit murder or suicide. They will, however, still "encourage 
military enlistment or even advise it as a way of maturing into manhood" 
(p. 732). Furthermore, they claim that freedom, autonomy, individual 
identity and self-actualization are abrogated by war and militarism. 
Counsellors need to change the social attitude which regards pacifists 
and resisters as "cowards" (p. 734). They recommend that counsellors 
attempt to present alternative images of man. Courage, bravery and 
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masculinity should be re-defined outside the realm of war. Healthy 
human development necessitates co-operation and freedom, not warfare and 
coercion. 
Thus, a new conception of courage would seem to entail several 
important factors. The changing emphasis on peace as opposed to warfare 
as a societal value appears to provide the stimulus for a cognitive re-
assessment of courage and heroism. Attitudes, values and belief systems 
appear to comprise an important affective component of contemporary 
courage. Resultant behaviour which is consistent with these new ideals 
seems to complete the basis for a new conception of courage. 
A Basic Explanatory Model 
The S-O-R or Contemporary Model 
Implicit in the above model of courage is the notion of rela-
tive freedom from traditional role definitions and the behavioural ex-
pectations inherent in societal norms. Emphasis has shifted away from 
the specific, prescribed nature of the response evident in the tradi-
tional model. Contemporary conceptions of courage stress not the speci-
fic nature of the response, but rather, the consistency inherent in this 
response with one's attitudes, values and/or ideals. 
Personal involvement, both cognitive and affective, provides 
the basis for subsequent action. These components of courage could be 
viewed as mediating variables. Since Responses which are labelled as 
"right" or "good" or "heroic" by the majority or ruling strata of society 
are being challenged, a certain amount of risk is involved in behaviour 
which is consistent with contemporary ideals. Thus, the cognitive com-
ponent of courage might be understood within the framework of risk-taking 
behaviour. Commitment to changing attitudes and the possibility of 
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personality correlates of contemporary courage comprise the affective 
component of personal involvement. 
The initial stimulus, while still technically external to the 
individual, no longer suggests the determinism of the traditional model. 
Rather, it functions as a crucial precipitating factor, a pre-requisite 
condition for change. The emphasis on personal involvement in the con-
temporary model and the relative freedom in the subsequent decision-
making process precludes the possibility of a socially-prescribed res-
ponse. The person rather than the external stimulus, determines the 
response. 
A Schematic Summary 
S 0 R 
(external to (cognitive) (overt behaviour con-
the individual) (affective) sistent with attitudes, 
values and/or ideals) 
e.g., war 
changing cultural norms 
Origin: specific events external to the individual such as 
American involvement in the Viet Nam war, the emerg-
ence of a "Youth Culture" (Keniston, 1965), concep-
tions of a changing culture (Slater, 1971 - "new" 
and "old" cultures) 
Operational Definitions: actively working towards change in 
a manner consistent with beliefs 
e.g., resisting the draft, signing an 
anti-war petition, joining a 
protest march, etc. 
Thus, implicit in contemporary courage are conceptions of 
change, consistency and a cognitive re-assessment of one's attitudes, 
values and ideals. Some risk is inherent in the decision to act. Rela-
tive freedom, as opposed to traditional determinism is the defining char-
acteristic of this model. 
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Contemporary conceptions of courage combine the moral courage 
of traditional models and the notion of self found in courage and sur-
vival into a more comprehensive personal involvement. The narrowly de-
fined ethical dimensions of traditional moral courage now find expression 
as value commitments to changing attitudes and ideals. The conformity 
inherent in the traditional model is replaced by the relative freedom of 
choice between disparate life-styles. Underlying this choice is a cog-
nitive assessment of the existing culture. The decision to risk personal 
involvement through action completes a definition of contemporary courage. 
Cultural Change: The "stimulus" for Personal Involvement 
Kincaid & Kincaid (1971) discuss the significant impact of the 
Viet Nam war. The escalation of the war during the period of 1964-1966, 
in conjunction with the rise of Black Power which the authors claim 
forced white activists to concentrate on their own community concerns, 
produced more than a specific anti-war movement. A genuine peace move-
ment emerged. Public political action was translated into private life-
styles and a generalized revolt against society. The emphasis was on 
"personal morality and individual responsibility, mutual aid and coopera-
tion, ecology and structural decentralization" (p. 732). Young people 
were demanding an end to all war. Their ideal was international peace. 
Markowltz (1971) also comments on the idealism of youth and 
their striving for peace. In contrast to the older generation, he claims 
that youth are much more idealistic about the possibilities of peace and 
cooperative efforts. He states that they insist on taking seriously 
their search for peace and good will in the world. 
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The phenomena of activism and student revolt are viewed by 
Kasin (1971) as being "a tragic waste of good human potential" (p. 49). 
He discusses the problem of Youth within the context of Sullivan's 
Interpersonal Theory and his 6 stages of development. Youth's dream of 
Utopias, it'8 striving for a better world and search for human dignity 
is understood as the desire for "need fulfillment" (p. 57). The permis-
siveness of liberal, middle class parents as well as encouragement of 
social criticism, curiosity and the pursuit of interests which support 
individualism, have left these young people in a type of limbo or unfil-
filled existence. Youth is not viewed as being a distinct stage of 
development. Rather, Youth is the result of permissiveness in the 
Childhood Stage. 
Youth experiences a conflict between ideals and the need to 
become adults and fit into society. Underlying this conflict is a state 
of tension and fear. Conformity to society's norms and amalgamation 
into the mainstream of society are viewed as necessary and inevitable 
events. Those who seek to realize ideals of peace are viewed as post-
poning the inevitable or simply escaping and ignoring their basic fear. 
Contemporary courage, if explained within the framework of 
Sullivan's theory, would be nothing more than a temporary maladjustment. 
The strivings of young people would merely reflect their basic fear of 
abandonment by a society which they need in order to fulfil "mutuality 
needs". Thus, youthful expression of ideals would be rooted in fear and 
a search for stability, rather than being indicative of courage and the 
pursuit of change. 
Keniston (in Holme, 1971) does attribute to Youth the status 
of a separate stage of development. Youth have passed through the 
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adolescent stage of development (e.g., rebellion) but are not prepared 
to commit themselves to the tasks of adulthood (e.g., marriage and a 
stable career). Emphasis is placed on commitment to values such as 
change, and openness. Youth questions the values of society and chooses 
to remain disengaged from an active and committed involvement with esta-
blished institutions. Focus is placed on the obvious lack of consistency 
between value and practice in adult society. 
The definite sense of commitment and the ensuing action, con-
sistent with one's values, inherent in contemporary conceptions of cour-
age, suggests that Youth, as a stage of development, is not an adequate 
explanatory framework. Ambivalence, a psychological characteristic of 
Youth, gives way to the sense of commitment characteristic of Adulthood. 
The pursuit of a definite role in life, regardless of whether it conforms 
to the prescribed roles of the prevailing majority, indicates that one 
has entered the Adult stage of development. 
As soon as a more definite engagement with society occurs-
whether this engagement takes the form of a more enduring 
commitment to revolution and social change, a more enduring 
acceptance of the existing society, or an intermediate 
position - youth is over, (in Holme, p. 439) 
Thus, contemporary courage might be defined as the commitment, 
in Adulthood, to values and ideals originating in Youth. Youth are 
allowed, not only the freedom, but the time to seriously question the 
values and practices of their society. They choose a life-style involv-
ing an active commitment towards change. This activism of young Adults 
may find expression both within the system (e.g., Civil Rights Movement) 
or outside the system per se (e.g., Peace Movement) (Katz, 1967). 
Relevant comments on the characteristics of contemporary youth 
are found in Slater (The Pursuit of Loneliness, 1971). He states that 
82 
youth feel the need to attribute a moral basis to their actions. They 
are characterized by a "diffuse moral absolutism" (p. 80) and thus 
render every act the status of a moral act. An "ideological justifica-
tion" (p. 80) underlies their behaviour. 
Slater's distinction between the two cultures extant in 
America today may serve as an explanatory framework for the emergence 
and/or existence of contemporary conceptions of courage. The values of 
cooperation, sharing and equalitarianism which characterize the new 
culture are taught in early childhood. Children of protective, child-
oriented middle-class parents are allowed to preserve these values for 
a longer period of time than the offspring of working class parents. 
Furthermore, Slater states: "His intellectual precocity makes it pos-
sible for him to integrate them into an ideological system with which he 
can confront the corrosive, life-abusing tendencies of the old culture" 
(p. 113). Rather than root this consequence of early childhood training 
within the rubric of fear and a need to return to the stability of the 
old, Slater attributes to it the status of a stimulus for future positive 
change. 
For the older generation, adherents of the old culture, the 
"ultimate moral reference group is the far right - authoritarian, puritan-
ical, punitive, fundamentalist" (p. 98). Middle-class college students, 
adherents of the new culture, employ as their reference group the New 
Left. The emphasis for new culture adherents are values such as "equal-
itarianism, radical democracy, social justice and social commitment" 
(p. 98). Priorities of the old culture, such as competition, secrecy, a 
preference for property rights and an emphasis on technology, are re-
versed by the new culture. The latter value cooperation and openness. 
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They emphasize personal rights and place considerable value on human 
needs. 
The values to which these opposing cultures are committed and 
the specific nature of the change their interests are focused on serves 
to differentiate contemporary conceptions of courage from more tradi-
tional notions. Old culture commitments are to stability. Old culture 
conceptions of change involve technological progress. New culture com-
mitments are to changing norms and life-styles. New culture conceptions 
of change have an ideological basis. The focus is on changing values, 
attitudes and modes of human interaction. Thus, commitment, change and 
consistency alone do not characterize contemporary courage. Rather, it 
is the specific nature of these characteristics which defines contemp-
orary courage. They have their basis in the new culture Slater describes. 
Contemporary Courage and Personal Involvement 
Cognitive 
Risk-taking theories may provide an explanatory framework for 
the cognitive component of courage. Implicit in definitions of risk is 
goal-seeking behaviour. Real-life situations invariably involve a choice 
among various goals. Awareness of the decision-making process and of the 
differing utilities attached to alternative goals renders the process a 
cognitive one. Uncertainty as to the probability of success when decid-
ing upon a specific goal defines the decision as risky. 
Contemporary conceptions of courage which involve commitment 
to changing values of the new culture imply the necessity of decision 
For a further description of the new culture, refer to Keniston, 1965. 
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making and cognizance of risk. Conformity to the values and roles 
characteristic of the old culture would appear to involve relatively 
rlskless decisions. Specific behaviours and/or decisions such as becom-
ing established in a career, joining the army, or "settling down" to 
family life are approved by old culture adherents. The alternatives 
available are all relatively clear-cut and safe in that they merit de-
finite acceptance by the majority. The decision to continue involvement 
with the new culture, on the other hand, is a risky one. The probabil-
ity of succeeding in the old culture sense (i.e., material success) is 
relatively low. The possibility of rejection along with criminal in-
dictment and/or exile must also be considered. The probability of 
effectiveness of the individual's actions must be weighed. 
The decision to follow the risky course of action inevitably 
involves some costs. Rejection by the majority of the old culture may 
however, be offset by the greater self-esteem and sense of autonomy 
which might accompany action consistent with values of the new culture. 
Willingness to incur costs such as possible imprisonment or exile rather 
than compromise one's values suggests that considerable forethought is 
involved. 
Recent studies (Ermalinski, 1972; Moore, 1972) attest to the 
cultural value of heroism and discuss it within the context of risk-
taking behaviour. Ermalinski (1972) investigated the level of risk Ss 
were willing to take when death was at stake as opposed to the risk Ss 
were willing to incur when their time, money or effort was at stake. 
He hypothesized that choosing survival and self-interest over heroism 
and unselfish behaviour would both invoke guilt and result in Ss 
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over-compensating on the time-money-effort questionnaire. Results con-
firmed the hypothesis. 
Moore (1972) questioned whether adolescents feel the need to 
prove their manhood by demonstration of some degree of competence at 
personal physical risk. In primitive societies, Moore claims, survival 
was dependent upon physical strength and courage. Manhood was synony-
mous with the ability to endure pain and the capacity to demonstrate 
great strength. In modern societies, survival is no longer as dependent 
upon physical strength and courage. Formal initiation rites involving 
physical risk are absent. In the absence of such formal rites de pass-
age Moore hypothesized that adolescents, by means of the "dare phenome-
non" (p. 249) would create their own challenges and initiation rites 
into adulthood. Results confirmed the hypothesis. 
The cultural value of heroism and the definite connection with 
risk in the above studies suggests that perhaps Brown's risk-as-value 
hypothesis might serve as an explanatory basis for courage. Brown's 
hypothesis states that a person usually views himself as being riskier 
than his peers. When in a group the individual realizes that he is not 
as risky as he initially perceived himself to be. As a result, he shifts 
towards the greater risk advocated by the group. When the value express-
ed by the group is a cautious or conservative one, as opposed to a risky 
one, the shift should be in the cautious direction. 
Ermalinski's study (1972) involving two conflicting values 
(heroism vs. personal survival) seemed to indicate that caution and self-
interest was the preferred value. Although risk was connected to both 
values, results indicated that the overall preference was for the rela-
tively "cautious" risk. Thus, explaining courage, either traditional or 
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contemporary, within the context of "risk-as-value" would of necessity 
have to account for the specific type of courageous action involved. If 
heroism-as-risk were the preferred value there should have been a greater 
willingness to risk death as opposed to time, money or effort in Ermal-
inski's study. 
The paper-and-pencil method employed by Ermalinski has defin-
ite limitations. One might conjecture that within the context of an 
actual group situation, where action is necessary, the value of heroism 
and the risk therein might allow for an explanation of "risk-as-value". 
Courageous behaviour such as risking one's life for another could be 
found within the context of altruism. The classic case of Kitty 
Genovese, however, again illustrates that although risk may be a value, 
this risk may be limited to monetary or otherwise relatively safe risks. 
Resorting to the explanation of a group cautious value expressed within 
that situation would necessitate a very loose definition of "group". 
Moore's study (1972) of delinquent and non-delinquent boys and 
the "dare phenomenon" appears to lend itself better to an interpretation 
of "risk-as-value". The non-delinquent group most often accepted a dare 
in order to prove that they were men. Over half of the delinquent group 
also indicated acceptance of a dare in order to prove they were men. A 
large percentage, however, also accepted the dare both to experience the 
thrill and excitement of the risky activity and to be accepted by the 
gang. Thus, the value placed on courage, and the risk involved therein, 
does not appear to be a sufficient explanation. 
Other studies indicate that stress and conformity may explain 
risk-taking behaviour. Lieblich (1968), using electrical shock to 
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create a stress situation, found that both relevant and irrelevant 
stress situations resulted in greater risk-taking behaviours. The neces-
sity to prove one's manhood, or one's courage, through acceptance of 
personal physical risk would seem to create a relatively stressful sit-
uation. Fulfilling the requirements of manhood through risky, courageous 
behaviour could just as well be a function of stress. 
Conformity may also explain courage in Moore's experiment. 
Utech and Hoving (1969) found that "conformity to the advice of parents 
is a decreasing function of age when parents and peers offer conflicting 
advice" (p. 271). Thus, accepting the dare phenomenon and demonstrating 
one's courage may be a function of conformity to peer-group norms. Like-
wise, courage, within the context of risk-taking behaviour, may be ex-
plained as being a function of conformity. 
The risk inherent in contemporary conceptions of courage in-
volves not only the physical risk of death or injury but also the psy-
chological risk of rejection and uncertainty as to the success of one's 
efforts. Both risk-as-value hypotheses and conformity interpretations 
of risk (Castore, Goodrich & Peterson, 1970; Clark & Crockett, 1971; 
Roberts & Castore, 1972) only partially explain contemporary courage. 
The basic values which middle-class college students espouse 
were initially taught to them by their parents. One could assume that 
parents, or members of the old culture, still have knowledge of these 
values (e.g. , cooperation) and perhaps practice them at times. Given 
that these same values are basic to members of the new culture, which 
in turn provides the stimulus for contemporary courage and the risk of 
change therein, one could seriously question the relevance of 
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risk-as-value to real life situations. Only under the broad assumption 
that parental groups primarily lean towards cautiousness and student 
groups lean generally towards riskiness is Brown's hypothesis appropri-
ate as an explanation of contemporary courage. Yet, risk-as-value can-
not account for the return to traditional commitments made by many 
students upon graduation. 
Conformity, as an explanation of risk and contemporary courage, 
also is far from adequate. Whereas it might account for college students' 
participation in for example, anti-war demonstrations, it fails, as did 
the risk-as-value hypothesis to account for the return of students to 
old culture values upon completing their education. Roberts and Castore 
(1972) exposed Ss to prerecorded tapes with various levels of risk and 
caution. The significant shift toward risk when the tape was oriented 
towards risk and the shift towards caution with the cautious tape sug-
gested a conformity effect. The significant change toward greater cer-
tainty in their decisions after listening to the tapes led the authors 
to suggest that an internalized attitude change had occurred. One might 
speculate, with respect to students' return to traditional roles upon 
graduating, that exposure to the real world and its ethic of competition 
may have produced another "internalized attitude change". If one were 
to accept this as an explanation, then mere exposure to the various 
groups with which we come into contact would result in a continual switch-
ing of internalized attitudes. This seems highly unlikely. 
Castore, Goodrich and Peterson (1970) also interpreted the 
risky shift as conformity "or an attitude change motivated by social 
comparison processes" (p. 322). They found that it was not Ss who 
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initially perceived themselves as being either Risky or Cautious, but 
Ss who perceived themselves as being the Same as their peers who switch-
ed their preferences. The authors argued that those who viewed them-
selves the Same as their peers may not have relied as heavily on internal 
standards in making their judgments. Those whose self-perceptions were 
nonveridical may not have been as committed to their positions as those 
whose self-perceptions were veridical. 
Thus, it might be assumed that conformity explanations may be 
adequate for those who view themselves as being similar to their college 
peers. Upon entrance into the world of work they may realize that they 
are, in actuality, more cautious and traditional than they had thought 
themselves to be. Those who are initially more militant, and committed 
to the values of the new culture, and those who perceive themselves as 
being traditional and committed to old culture values may be veridical 
in their self-perceptions and hence remain with their respective commit-
ments after college. The presence of risk-related considerations per se 
do not determine a person's response. Rather, commitment to his position, 
which is veridical, and reliance on internal as opposed to external stan-
dards determine a person's actions. Thus, a veridical self-perception 
as risky and self-reliant may explain contemporary courage. 
Clark and Crockett (1971) also provide support for the con-
formity or reference group interpretation of the risky shift. While 
high risk-takers shifted towards the cautious norm, as did initially 
low-risk-takers, upon hearing the cautious tape, they still managed 
to remain on the risky side. The author suggested that high-risk 
takers are less susceptible to group influence than low risk-takers. 
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The hypothesized greater self-reliance and veridical self-
perceptions of Ss as risk-takers in addition to their low susceptibility 
to the pull of the group could explain contemporary courage. The fact 
that some small shift towards caution does occur might explain the 
acceptance of some traditional roles upon leaving college. These may be 
the less visible adherents of the new culture. They might also be de-
fined as those working towards change "within" the system, as opposed to 
the activists operating outside the system proper (Katz, 1967). 
The risk implicit in contemporary conceptions of courage also 
involves the aspect of uncertainty. The probability of short or even 
long-range success of one's efforts is difficult to determine. Actions 
consistent with values of the new culture (e.g., cooperation and peace) 
of necessity, possess uncertain outcomes. Contemporary courage involves 
not merely concrete objectives such as changing laws, but abstract goals 
such as attitude change and a general re-structuring of the basic values 
underlying our life-style. Adding to the uncertainty is the questionable 
amount of time and effort which needs to be expended before and if ideals 
are to be realized. 
Marquis and Reitz (1969) describe "pure risk" as "the situation 
in which the decision maker knows all possible outcomes and can assign 
definite probabilities to each outcome" (p. 281). "Uncertainty" is des-
cribed by the authors as "the situation in which the decision maker is 
unable to assign definite values to outcomes and/or is unable to assign 
definite probabilities to each outcome" (p. 281). Life situations, as 
opposed to the gambling games most often employed in risk-taking experi-
ments, are characterized by uncertainty. The authors constructed problems 
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involving pure risk, small uncertainty and large uncertainty. The 
hypothesis that individuals would risk more on the pure risk as opposed 
to the uncertain items was confirmed. 
The uncertainty involved in contemporary courage when viewed 
in light of the above results may explain the relatively small number of 
adherents to the ranks of the militants. Individuals may be quite hesi-
tant to stake considerable involvement in activities or life-styles 
which have dubious probabilities of success or effectiveness. Further 
results reported by Marquis and Reitz however, state that group involve-
ment significantly increases willingness to take risks on problems in-
volving uncertainty. They speculate that "group discussion not only 
magnifies expected value, but also achieves clarification (reduction of 
uncertainty) with a consequent shift to a more risky choice" (p. 288). 
Thus, the seeming greater involvement of college students with values 
characteristic of the new culture and their active radicalism may in part 
be a function of group involvement. Leaving college may result in a dis-
persion of the group and the consequent shift to a less risky and more 
traditional life-style. 
Higbee and Streufert (1969) note a discrepancy between results 
obtained in laboratory and real life situations. They report that ex-
perimental studies indicate a greater willingness to take risks for Ss 
who feel that they have control over the outcome of their decisions. 
Chance orientations, on the other hand, appear to result in a lower will-
ingness to take risks. Higbee and Streufert claim that many real life 
situations produce opposite results. Individuals in control are less 
risky than individuals not in control of their environment. They state: 
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The conditions producing risky decision making in the kinds 
of real-world situations described above [politics, war, 
competitive sports] may differ from the psychological lab-
oratory studies in several ways: 1) most such real-world 
situations involve conflict - the people not in control 
want to gain control; 2) potential loss and gain is likely 
to be greater in the real world; 3) there is probably greater 
personal involvement of the decision makers in the real world 
(since careers, fortunes, and lives are often at stake); and 
4) outcomes of decisions in the real world are more complex, 
based on interacting multiple determinants rather than on a 
single determinant (such as the roll of a die), (p. 105) 
Higbee and Streufert employed the "tactical negotiations game" (p. 106) 
in an effort to study risk-taking in a simulated real-life situation. 
Results indicated that Ss with less control over their environment were 
significantly riskier than Ss who were in control. The authors studied 
economic decision-making in their experiment. 
Malmuth and Fesbach (1972) investigated the risky shift in a 
naturalistic setting. They questioned whether the risky shift could be 
demonstrated in a realistic choice situation where the expected values 
were not constant. The situation was designed so that choosing the risky 
alternative was contrary to rational decision making. They found that, 
contrary to the Individual Condition, decisions of individuals were 
"riskier from the first trial within the Group Condition" (p. 45). They 
postulated that the lack of finality and the uncertainty of their indi-
vidual decisions, coupled with the value of risk may have accounted for 
the results. 
Thus, the uncertainty or "chance" nature of contemporary cour-
age, coupled with the likelihood of a group situation, at least on the 
level of discussion, may lend itself to interpretation by risk-taking 
theories. The generality of risk-taking across different situations, 
however, must be taken into account. All of the studies cited involved 
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economic risk-taking situations. Contemporary conceptions of courage 
involve non-economic and abstract conceptions of risk. Values, ideals, 
attitudes and change are at stake as opposed to money which may be 
hypothetical or if real, may not belong to the individual. A general 
disposition towards risk which is valid in various situations is neces-
sary if contemporary courage is to be adequately explained within the 
framework of risk-taking theory. 
Jackson, Hourany and Vidmar (1972) state that although risk-
taking is assumed to be a general psychological disposition, and hence 
generalizable across situations and various types of risk, "attempts to 
find convergent validity among various risk-taking measures have yielded 
discouraging results" (p. 483). A number of hypotheses have been gen-
erated to explain this lack of generality. The authors suggest that the 
multi-dimensionality of risk-taking may account for the failure by 
previous studies to establish positive correlations between various risk-
taking measures and objective measures of risk. Most risk-taking studies 
have concentrated on a single dimension of risk, that of monetary risk 
taking. The authors hypothesized: 
risk-taking may be conceptualized in terms of an hierachi-
cal model. In this model the dimension of risk-taking is 
a higher order construct with four constituent facets. 
These facets will be reflected in consistent and to a 
certain extent independent behaviour across diverse methods 
of measurement, (p. 487) 
Thus, risk-taking may vary across four categories of situations: 
monetary, physical, ethical and social. Four methods of measurement were 
developed for each facet: a Self-rating scale, situational dilemmas, 
Vocational choice and a Personality Scale. Correlational and factor 
analytic data supported hypothesis cited above. Although four independent 
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factors were obtained, they were able to isolate a generalized risk-
taking factor at the second order. 
The above study has implications for future meaningful research 
concerning courage. Results suggest that we might explain both tradi-
tional and contemporary courage within the framework of a general risk-
taking disposition. Furthermore, the two types of courage isolated in 
this paper, traditional and contemporary, appear to correspond with the 
two facets of risk-taking entitled physical and social, respectively. 
It might, therefore, be possible, by constructing a multi-trait, multi-
method matrix similar to that suggested above, to verify assumptions as 
to the self-image, behaviour, life-style and personality of individuals 
who appear to demonstrate a specific form of courage. 
The decision-making process and risk inherent in contemporary 
courage was not adequately explained by risk-as-value or conformity 
explanations of the risky-shift phenomenon. A theoretical organization 
of viable explanations of the risky-shift (Vinokur, 1971) concludes that 
Brown's hypothesis which states that information about others' choices 
should be sufficient to produce the risky shift, must be rejected. 
Vinokur claims that the crucial factor responsible for either risky or 
conservative shifts appears to involve "the flow of information relevant 
to the issue being decided upon" (p. 236). 
The overt decision change, according to cognitive explanations 
of the risky shift, is a result of "a covert cognitive opinion change" 
(Vinokur, p. 236). One's cognitive assessment of the situation being 
evaluated determines the decision change, not the direct influence of 
the situation per se. Contemporary conceptions of courage, which stress 
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cognitive assessment of the values of the old culture, appears to be 
more amenable to an explanation which emphasizes decision making within 
the context of content assessment. The decision to risk adherence to 
new culture values and life-styles does not appear to be a result of mere 
exposure to college reference groups. The shift toward risk, or the 
active commitment to change, might be a result of the information ob-
tained and the arguments which are generated during discussion of values 
and ideals with one's peers. Vinokur describes this cognitive hypothesis 
as "Risk-as-Value Hypothesis: Information Relevant to the Task" (p. 236). 
The "Rationality: Expected Value and Subjective Expected 
Utility Hypotheses" (p. 237) are also postulated by Vinokur as viable 
explanations of the risky shift. Behavioural decision theory, the basis 
of this cognitive hypothesis, concerns itself primarily with choices 
among alternative outcomes. The values and utilities (personal subjec-
tive value) placed on outcomes of alternative actions, in addition to 
the probabilities and subjective probabilities that outcomes will result 
from a specific course of action, constitute the basic variables in this 
theory. When subjective average gain is the criterion for choosing an 
alternative course of action, the subjective probabilities (sp.) are 
multiplied by the utilities (u.). The formula states: 
n 
SEU = I sp.u. 
i=l 1 1 
Contemporary conceptions of courage could be explained and 
possibly subjected to experimental research within the context of the 
Subjective Expected Utility Hypothesis. The above formula could be 
roughly defined within the framework of choosing the life-style of the 
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new culture as a preferred action. The basis for making this decision 
would be the greater SEU of this choice. Although the utilities would 
be perceived as being quite high, the short term subjective probabilities 
may be quite low. This, however, might be offset by the long term sub-
jective probabilities. In other words, active adherence to new culture 
values may not result in immediate positive outcomes. In fact, draft 
evaders or active civil rights workers may face not only objective nega-
tive outcomes but also subjective negative outcomes. The latter may take 
the form of exile, imprisonment or perhaps assassination.The long range 
goals and belief that utilities (subjective values) will be realized 
would increase the subjective probability that their actions will result 
in the hoped for outcome. 
Cognitive hypotheses assume that information exchange is the 
crucial factor responsible for the risky shift. Interactive hypotheses, 
on the other hand, stress that interaction among group members is neces-
sary for the shift towards risk to occur. The "Extremity and Influence" 
(p. 239) hypothesis states that the risky shift is a function of an 
extreme position taken by a member of the group. Concomitant with this 
extreme position is greater confidence in his position. The "Commitment-
to-Risk" (p. 240) hypothesis argues that the more confident members who 
take an extreme position are also more committed to their position. This 
greater sense of commitment may simply be the result of the greater post-
decisional dissonance following the decision, based on extensive prior 
thought, to choose the risky alternative. Conservative shifts are ex-
plained by the "influence through commitment hypothesis" (p. 240). 
Members who prefer the more conservative alternative with a high 
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probability of success influence those who prefer the risky choice but 
are not as confident of their decisions. 
Although seemingly incompatible, Vinokur claims that together 
they may explain the risky shift in its full strength. Taking the more 
extreme position in the group may reflect the level and quality of the 
information he holds. The more persuasive he feels his arguments are 
in favour of a certain alternative, the more confident he will be in 
holding his position. Actually engaging in group discussion should pro-
duce the strongest shifts. The less extreme members will have the oppor-
tunity to ask direct questions of the more extreme members and thus 
clarify most points. 
Whereas the specific nature of the interaction and information 
exchange has been theoretically outlined, Vinokur remarks: 
So far, nothing has been assumed about the nature of the 
persuasive arguments. It remains to be seen whether the 
persuasive arguments are those appealing to cultural values 
of riskiness and caution in given situations, as Brown's 
value hypothesis implies, or whether they are merely infor-
mational arguments bearing more specifically upon the de-
sirabilities (utilities) of the various possible outcomes 
in each situation, (p. 245) 
Contemporary conceptions of courage, while at once explainable within 
the framework of the postulated combination of cognitive and interactive 
hypotheses, may serve to clarify the nature of the persuasive arguments 
involved. The poor fit of Brown's hypothesis and conformity explanations 
of contemporary courage suggests that the confidence of activists in 
their extreme positions and their commitment to new culture life-styles 
may be based upon a striving to achieve valued goals rather than upon 
a need to view themselves as similar to their peers. 
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Affective 
Commitment. Central to contemporary conceptions of courage is 
the affective aspect of personal involvement defined as "commitment". 
Committing oneself to a definite course of action both defines contemp-
orary courage within the adult realm and adds some degree of definitive-
ness to the decision. The aspect of commitment also serves to further 
specify the precise nature of one's decision as relatively irreversible. 
Concomitant with this notion of possible irreversibility is the possibil-
ity of post-decisional cognitive dissonance and the necessity of defend-
ing one's choice. 
Most commitments within the context of contemporary courage, 
one might assume, are irreversible only in a relative sense. For 
example, active involvement and adherence to values of the new culture 
may be only temporary or part-time in nature. Involvement in these 
activities may not be total in terms of time, effort or life-style. 
Writing a letter to an M.P., donating spare time to peace movement or 
civil rights efforts, while necessitating some commitment, is not final 
and binding. The need to defend publically such involvement may also be 
minimal. 
Other commitments inherent in contemporary courage may involve 
a more absolute concept of irreversibility. The decision not to obey 
the draft, for example, could involve permanent exile, a period of 
imprisonment and/or a heavy monetary fine. Such commitments to active 
adherence to new culture values often necessitate the public statement 
and quite probably, defense, of one's decision to the courts and/or 
family members. One assumption might be that failure to realize one's 
99 
goals, in view of having made such a binding commitment, may result in 
dissonance and the need to justify one's actions. 
Watts (1966) studied commitment under conditions of risk. He 
suggested that a person's perceived estimate of the probability of 
occurrence of an event was "an important variable mediating the cognitive 
effects of the decision by determining whether the individual feels a 
need to defend his prior act" (p. 507). He stated that cognitive dis-
sonance reduction need not occur in the case where a person had made the 
decision to prepare for an event which, although almost certain to occur, 
fails to materialize. Regret, anger or frustration would most likely be 
the result. If a person decides to prepare for an event which is uncer-
tain to occur, and indeed, does not occur, dissonance reduction should 
follow. Watts stated that the latter is consistent with self-esteem 
theory and notions of "inadequate justification". 
Results (Watts, 1966) indicated that the Main Effect of Choice 
was significant in the low probability condition. Ss having high choice 
indicated greater manifestations of dissonance reduction. The second-
order interaction involving probability of outcome, choice and obtained 
outcome was also significant and in the predicted direction. In the dis-
sonant condition (event not occurring) Ss who chose to prepare for the 
event, in spite of its low probability of occurrence, rated the prepara-
tion as less unpleasant than Ss who had no choice. 
The risk and uncertainty implicit in contemporary conceptions 
of courage would seem to justify attributing a relatively low probability 
to the actual occurrence of the hoped for outcome. The choice to adhere 
actively to "new" culture values and suffer the consequences of working 
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towards change may be rated as high. The poor fit of conformity and 
risk-as-value hypotheses suggests that people are not pulled towards 
active acceptance of new values and a new life-style involuntarily. The 
decision to accept the commitment to risk is a rational choice. 
The slow process of cultural change suggests that new culture 
adherents might accept either no change or even small setbacks in their 
efforts for some time. They might remain fairly committed to their 
cause, accepting the negative consequences of perhaps exile or imprison-
ment, for several years without cognitive dissonance. However, with the 
passage of time, and with new wars starting in various corners of the 
earth, these individuals may begin to perceive that the hoped for change 
has not and possibly will never actually occur. Still, they have suffer-
ed the rejection and the lowered self-esteem which might accompany im-
2 
prisonment and exile with a very low probability of amnesty. 
The new culture adherent may begin to feel that all of his 
time, efforts and hopes have been for naught. He may, as Watts states 
"perceive that he has made an irrational decision in a rational world... 
feel foolish or dissonant, and attempt to defend his decision if it comes 
to naught" (p. 515). The positive acclaim for new culture values, and 
the expressed dislike by those exiled for war and the United States, may 
merely be justifications which serve to reduce their state of dissonance. 
Studies which examine the effect of commitment warnings on 
predecision (Mann & Taylor, 1970) and postdecision (Mann, 1971) bolster-
ing suggest that perhaps dissonance reduction is not an entirely adequate 
President Gerald Ford has granted conditional amnesty to American war 
deserters and draft resistors, September, 1974. 
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explanation of commitment and contemporary courage. Theoretically, 
the choice involved in contemporary conceptions of courage has been de-
fined as largely a cognitive process. New culture activists may feel, 
as Watts states: "that (they have) made a rational decision in an irra-
tional world" (p. 515). Should this be the case, dissonance reduction 
would not be the result. Rather, simple regret, anger or frustration 
would be experienced and expressed. 
In an objective sense, the probability of the specific out-
comes of peace and cooperation occurring may be quite low. The continu-
ance of wars and the competitive ethic may indeed be interpreted as the 
outcome not being realized. Yet, subjective experience of the probabil-
ity that the goal one is striving toward will be realized may render the 
individual's perceptions of his decision as rational. Short-term nega-
tive events may not be interpreted by new culture activists as non-
occurrence of the outcome. 
In relation to contemporary conceptions of courage, the concept 
of "bolstering" may be employed to determine whether cognitive dissonance 
reduction as opposed to a rational preference for new culture values is 
operating. Mann (1971) defines postdecisional bolstering as "a 'spread-
ing apart' in the attractiveness of the alternatives such that the chosen 
alternative increases in value and the unchosen alternative decreases in 
value relative to each other" (p. 76). If, under conditions of commit-
ment, bolstering should occur, then one might assume that new culture 
activists are merely justifying their actions by enhancing the attractive-
ness of their chosen alternative. 
Mann and Taylor (1970) studied the effect of commitment, in 
combination with choice difficulty, on predecisional processes. The 
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authors postulated that commitment, which would render a choice as irre-
versible, may evoke greater sensitivity to the possibility of postdeci-
sional regret. As a result, the alternatives may be more carefully 
appraised in a rational and unbiased manner. No commitment under diffi-
cult choice situations should produce bolstering since the choice is 
viewed as being reversible. When the choice is easy (that is, alterna-
tives are disparate rather than close in value) then relatively little 
bolstering should occur regardless of commitment conditions. 
The above conditions of commitment/no commitment and easy/ 
difficult choice could readily be employed to describe contemporary 
courage. Using Mann and Taylor's definition of alternatives being either 
close or disparate in value and hence defining the subsequent choice as 
difficult or easy, one might postulate that choosing new as opposed to 
old culture attitudes and life-style might be termed an "easy" choice 
situation. The value differences are quite clear-cut (e.g., peace versus 
war). Commitment to new culture values should, therefore, produce little 
bolstering. 
The previous assumptions made as to relative and absolute 
irreversibility of commitments within the new culture could provide the 
basis for a "difficult choice" situation. The decision to follow one 
particular course of action as opposed to another In the pursuit of one's 
goals is based on a common set of values, ideals and/or attitudes. The 
consequences of commitment to one course of action, such as draft resist-
ance, may be considerably more binding and irreversible than the conse-
quences of another alternative, such as participating in a protest march. 
Choosing the latter alternative might, in view of Mann's definition of 
commitment as an irrversible choice, be regarded as a "no commitment 
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condition". In line with Mann and Taylor's predictions, one might ex-
pect systematic bolstering to occur in the difficult choice, no commit-
ment condition. 
Initial results (Mann & Taylor, 1970) indicated systematic bol-
stering regardless of commitment under difficult choice conditions. 
Strengthening the commitment by requiring Ss to publically defend their 
choice eliminated the bolstering in the difficult choice, commitment 
condition as predicted by conflict theory. Thus, the different levels 
of commitment within the new culture life-style might be interpreted 
within the framework of different pre-decisional processes. In line 
with risk-taking theories, the more active militants may be the more 
committed members of the new culture. In line with predictions of con-
flict theory, these more committed activists may also be basing their 
decisions on objective cognitive processes as opposed to subjective 
evaluations. 
Mann (1971) examined the effects of a commitment warning on 
children's decisions. He stated that previous research has revealed 
postdecisional bolstering in the commitment condition. His study failed 
to confirm previous predictions. Mann's explanation for the lack of post-
decisional bolstering centered upon the possible lack of postdecisional 
dissonance in the commitment condition. The possibility that the deci-
sion may have been binding and irrevocable may have elicited a careful, 
well-thought out decision. He speculated that noncommitment Ss may have 
made their decisions in haste and then felt some dissonance, hence moti-
vating them to bolster their decisions. Mann states: 
If, indeed, time taken to announce a choice in the commit-
ment condition is devoted to cognitive work aimed at pre-
venting postdecisional dissonance, then subjects with the 
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longest decision times should be least likely to bolster 
postdecisionally. (p. 77) 
One should expect a negative correlation between time spent in scanning 
the alternatives and the magnitude of postdecisional dissonance reduc-
tion. The correlation between decision time and bolstering (r = - .28) 
supported Mann's expectation (p. < .05). There was no association be-
tween time and bolstering in the noncommitment condition. 
In relation to contemporary conceptions of courage, one might 
speculate that commitment to a decision whose consequences are substan-
tial, and perhaps irreversible, is indicative of a well thought out 
decision. The presence of pre and/or postdecisional bolstering, in com-
bination with the level of commitment to new culture values, may serve 
to establish a qualitative distinction within the realm of contemporary 
courage. Those who are merely conforming to their present reference 
group and are not fully committed may experience dissonance. Their re-
sultant acclaim of new culture values and life-style may simply be a 
need to justify their actions and thus reduce their dissonance. 
Attitude. Inherent in the distinction between the old and new 
culture has been the notion of attitude change. More specifically, active 
adherence to the values of the new culture and contemporary conceptions 
of courage have been examined within the context of a general striving 
for peace and an attitude of pacifism. The specific nature of the atti-
tude change implicit in contemporary courage may, in part, be explained 
within the framework of changing attitudes toward war. 
Since proponents of the new culture have been described as 
young, college age persons one might assume that changing attitudes to-
wards pacifism are characteristic primarily of the younger generation. 
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Public Opinion Polls provide somewhat contradictory evidence. Erskine 
(1970) claims that opposition to the Vietnam war seems to be more wide-
spread among the older generation. When asked, in October 1969, whether 
the war was a "mistake", 63% of the respondents aged 50 years and older 
replied in the affirmative. A somewhat smaller percentage, 58%, of 
those aged 21-29, also considered the war a mistake (p. 134). The author 
calls this consideration of war as a mistake a "most inexplicable mys-
tery" (Erskine, 1972, p. 616). 
However, when the issue involves active protesting of the war 
and public acknowledgement of one's position, the differing attitudes of 
old as opposed to young become more apparent. A Harris survey obtained 
in November, 1969, revealed that 52% of those under age 35 sympathized 
with the goals of those actively demonstrating, marching or otherwise 
protesting the Vietnam War. In contrast, only 28% of those over age 50 
sympathized with such active demonstrations of attitude towards the war 
(Erskine, 1970, p. 134). 
A further analysis of 185 poll items, dating from 1936 to late 
1970, indicated that the shift towards pacifism is indeed more widespread 
among the young. Before 1965, the young exceeded the old in pacifism on 
only 38% of the items. After 1968, the young exceeded the old in pacif-
ism on 75% of the items. Thus, from being -2.3 average points less 
pacifistic than the old before 1965, the young have moved to a position 
where after 1968, they were +6.0 percentage points more pacifistic, on 
the average, than those aged 50 and older (Erskine, 1972, p. 616). 
Handberg (1972) compared the answers of college students to 
items on the pacifism scale developed by Putney and Middleton, obtained 
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in 1962 and 1972. Results are presented in Table 1. The most extreme 
pacifistic statements on the scale (questions 2 and 5) were accepted in 
1962 by only 6 and 17% respectively. In 1972, 31% as opposed to 6% ten 
years earlier felt that the U.S. should begin gradual disarmament whether 
other countries do or not, should disarmament negotiations fail. Also, 
49% in 1972 as opposed to 17% ten years earlier, felt that it was con-
trary to their moral principles to participate in war and the killing of 
others. A substantial percentage (67% in 1972 as opposed to 31% in 1962) 
also felt that the real enemy was war and not Communism. Support for 
pacifism as a practical philosophy also increased. 
The over 30 group were less pacifistic on all items than the 
younger students with the exception of #6 which dealt with pacifism as a 
practical philosophy. Social science and science majors were more prone 
to pacifism. Business majors were the least pacifistic. 
Handberg suggests that his results, obtained in a very con-
servative and militaristic section of the United States, are indicative 
of more than a situational response to the Vietnam war. Rather, a more 
generalized response which might be called "the Vietnam analogy" (p. 615) 
may have emerged. He described the essence of this response as being 
"an aversion to the use of force in international politics at any level, 
for any reason other than perhaps self-defence" (p. 615). 
Opinion Poll results provide general statistics which may aid 
in further defining contemporary conceptions of courage. The active ad-
herent to new culture values and attitudes is likely to be a member of 
the young adult age group. The committed activist is also likely to be 
a student of the social sciences and perhaps belong to the upper class. 
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TABLE 1 
Percentage Of Students Who Agree Or Mostly Agree 
With Items In Pacifism Scale 
Percentage of Students 
Items in Pacifism Scale 
Males Females Total 
1962 1972 1962 1972 1962 1972 
1. The U.S. must be will-
ing to run any risk of 
war which may be neces-
sary to prevent the 
spread of Communism 
2. If disarmament nego-
tiations are not suc-
cessful, the U.S. should 
begin a gradual program 
of unilateral disarma-
ment, i.e., disarm whe-
ther other countries do 
or not 
3. Pacifist demonstrations-
picketing missile bases, 
peace walks, etc.- are 
harmful to the best in-
terests of the American 
people. 
4. The U.S. has no moral 
right to carry its 
struggle against Com-
munism to the point of 
risking the destruction 
of the human race. 
5. It is contrary to my 
moral principles to par-
ticipate in war and the 
killing of other people. 
6. The real enemy today is 
no longer Communism 
k but rather war itself. 
7. Pacifism is simply not a 
practical philosophy in 
the world today. 
Number of cases 
78 22 64 32 72 25 
30 34 6 31 
50 17 37 15 44 17 
30 83 40 90 34 85 
15 
26 
60 
43 
65 
41 
20 
37 
45 
(697) (109) (502) 
66 17 49 
73 31 67 
27 54 37 
(41) (1199) (150) 
Reverse-scoring items on Pacifism Scale. 
Data Table from Handberg, 1972, p. 612. 
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A complete definition of contemporary courage, however, entails commit-
ment to action as well as attitudes. Opinion Poll results indicate that 
the older generation, although perhaps as pacifistic in attitude, are 
not nearly as willing to risk or condone active striving for change. 
The suggestion that changing attitudes towards pacifism are 
indicative of a general response to war may also lend some validity to a 
definition of contemporary courage as the active expression of changing 
attitudes and life-style. Defining contemporary courage as a situation-
al response to, for example, the Vietnam war, might suggest that active 
personal involvement would cease with the war. The new culture frame-
work of contemporary courage, with its necessary component of active 
commitment consistent with its values and attitudes, provides for an on-
going phenomenon which, at least theoretically, should know no temporal 
boundaries. 
Rosenbaum and Rosenbaum (1973) investigated attitude changes 
of college students for three areas of international conflict. Attitude 
measure results showed a statistically significant interaction between 
Age and Issue (p. 168). The most dovish attitudes towards United States 
involvement in Vietnam were held by those aged 23 and younger. In con-
trast, students aged 24 and older were least dovish with regards to 
United States involvement in Vietnam and more dovish than younger stu-
dents with regards to the Arab-Israel and India-Pakistan conflicts. 
Personal importance ratings showed statistically significant 
Age and Issue main effects. The resolution of international conflicts 
was of greater importance to younger students. The resolution of the 
Vietnam conflict was also of greater significance than resolving other 
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international conflicts. A significant Time main effect, however, 
suggests an increase in apathy. Regardless of sex, Ss in 1971 rated the 
issues as being of less personal importance than did Ss in 1969. This 
might, at first glance, suggest that contemporary courage is indeed sit-
uational. With the passing of time, and the official end of the Vietnam 
war, the importance of war-related issues and the concomitant need felt 
by young students to actively strive for peace, may disappear. 
The significant interaction between Issue and Time lends some 
support for a general, rather than situational, attitudinal component of 
contemporary courage. Although Vietnam was perceived as being less im-
portant in 1971, the India-Pakistan conflict increased significantly in 
personal importance. Thus, contemporary conceptions of courage might be 
defined as the voluntary and active commitment to the general goal of 
peace in the world. The important factor appears to be the "reluctance 
on the part of the American college students studied to have the United 
States involved in any of these areas of international conflict, and 
that this reluctance has become more pronounced with the passage of 
time" (Rosenbaum & Rosenbaum, 1973). 
Implicit in contemporary conceptions of courage is an active 
commitment to an attitude of pacifism. Studies which indicate that anti-
involvement is the rule do not necessarily fulfil the requirements of 
this definition. Jones (1970) grouped the 22 items on the Droba Attitude 
Toward War Scale into four types. Type 1 (4 items) were prowar or 
militaristic in nature, measuring primarily attitudes towards human en-
gagement in war. Type II (5 items) were antiwar or pacifistic in nature 
and measured attitudes toward human suffering and personal commitment in 
Ill 
characterized as Authoritarian. New culture proponents question the 
dictates of authority. They value openness and change. Studies which 
link degrees of Authoritarianism and Dogmatism to varying attitudes to-
wards war may provide some evidence for personality correlates of con-
temporary courage. 
Karabenick and Wilson (1969) state that Hawks (pro Vietnam 
War-VW) as well as J)oves (anti Vietnam war-AVW) "have been characterized 
as closed-minded and intolerant toward others not sharing their beliefs" 
(p. 419). If this were the case, Doves as well as Hawks should not 
differ in their scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (D-scale). In addi-
tion, both Hawks and Doves should score higher on the D-scale than those 
with more moderate beliefs towards the Vietnam war. To test whether 
Rokeach's scale was independent of belief systems, the authors construct-
ed and validated a scale measuring Vietnam war attitudes (VW Scale). 
This VW-scale was correlated with the D-scale. 
Results indicate a significant positive correlation between VW-
and D-scales (p. 420). Bailes and Guller (1970), in a similar study, 
also found a small but statistically significant correlation between D 
and V scales. Thus, open and closed mindedness, as measured by the D-
scale, is not unrelated to belief systems as signified by attitudes for 
and against the Vietnam war. Further results (Karabenick & Wilson, 1969; 
Bailes & Guller, 1970) indicate that an inverse relationship exists be-
tween Dogmatism and opposition towards the Vietnam war. Doves were 
significantly less dogmatic than both Moderates and Hawks. 
Proponents of the new culture might, in view of the above 
results, be described as possessing cognitive structures characterized 
by open-mindedness. These low-D persons tend to evaluate information on 
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war. Type III (7 items) were concerned with theory about war and peace. 
Type IV was comprised of six miscellaneous items (p. 55-56). Of signi-
ficance for contemporary courage are changing trends in answers to Type 
I and Type II items from the 1950's to 1967. 
For the militaristic items there was an increase of 14 percent 
in the direction of pacifism, or nonacceptance of these items. For the 
pacifistic items there was a decrease of 10 percent in the acceptance of 
these items. Thus, the changing attitudes toward pacifism appear to 
stem moreso from changing attitudes toward what Ss were against (i.e., 
militarism) than what Ss were for (i.e., pacifism). The decision not to 
fight cannot be interpreted as a decision to commit oneself and work for 
peace. 
Contemporary conceptions of courage, in view of Jones* results, 
might be validly applicable to only a small minority of those who appear 
to hold pacifistic attitudes. Rather than simply condemning what exists 
the ranks of the courageous would consist of those actively committed 
towards positive change. Jones speculated that this "minority may be in 
its impact greater than its size. In its extreme and activist methods it 
may attract enough attention from the mass media and from uncommitted 
youth liking excitement to magnify its force far above its numerical 
strength" (p. 78). 
Personality Correlates 
The aspect of personal involvement, both cognitive and affec-
tive, has served to distinguish contemporary from traditional conceptions 
of courage. Underlying the cognitive decision to accept risk and an 
active commitment towards changing attitudes may be personality corre-
lates of contemporary courage. Old culture adherents have been 
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the basis of its own merits, rather than its source. Open-mindedness 
also "implies the capacity to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty until 
'sufficient' data are available to justify a conclusion about an issue 
on more or less intellectual grounds" (Bailes & Guller, 1970). 
The above authors also note that Authoritarianism as measured 
by the F-scale correlates positively with Rokeach's D-scale. Thus, 
individuals scoring low on the D-scale might also score low on the F-
scale and hence not be as responsive to authority. Contemporary concep-
tions of courage, however, would require that results indicating low F-
and D-scores would be applicable to Dovish actions as well as attitudes. 
Izzett (1971) obtained both self-report and behavioural mea-
sures of attitudes towards and support for the Vietnam war. He hypothe-
sized that students not attending class on the day of the October 15, 
1969 Moratorium on the Vietnam war would have significantly lower F-
scores than those who did attend class. Paper and pencil attitude mea-
sures should also reflect greater anti-VNW attitudes for those not attend-
ing class. Results confirm the predictions. Although neither group of 
students were proponents of the Vietnam war, those who did not attend 
class on October 16, 1969, expressed significantly stronger disagreement 
with two out of the three items reflecting pro-war sentiments. Izzett 
concludes that a lower F-score most likely reflects greater opposition 
towards the Vietnam war. 
Granberg & Corrigan (1972) found that both A and D were in-
versely related to Dovish attitudes towards and fewer protest actions 
against the VNW. A significant positive correlation between A and D and 
between attitudes and actions was obtained for their sample. Results 
indicated that "higher authoritarianism was significantly related with 
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more favourable evaluations of U.S. military actions in Vietnam and 
fewer actions taken in protest against the war" (p. 472). The more 
stable and pervasive correlations between A and VNW orientations led 
them to conclude that the D-scale Is not as ideologically correlated 
with VNW attitudes as the A-scale. 
The above studies appear to provide some support for a descrip-
tion of the active new culture adherent as significantly more open-minded 
and less readily accepting of the dictates of traditional authority than 
the old culture proponent. Yet, to link these characteristics more con-
clusively to contemporary conceptions of courage would require a more 
detailed delineation of the type of protest action involved. Those mere-
ly supporting a policy of anti-involvement by attending a moratorium would 
have to be compared to those more active in working towards positive 
change. One might speculate that those committed towards a course of 
positive change might represent the lower extreme with respect to A- and 
D-scale scores. The broad categorization of Doves, in view of contempor-
ary courage, could appropriately be subdivided into "committed" and 
"uncommitted" Doves. 
Granberg and May (1972) investigated the relationship of 
Internal-External control and orientations towards the Vietnam war. They 
state that previous research has shown non-violent civil rights workers 
to be primarily internal whereas violent activists were significantly 
external in beliefs. They hypothesized that Dovish attitudes and actions 
should be positively correlated with internal control. Results failed 
to support the hypothesis. They found "a slight but significant trend... 
for externality to be positively related to more dovish attitudes (r = .12) 
and to more protest actions (r = .13). Partialling out attitudes, however, 
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reduced the externality-protest action correlation to nonsignificance. 
With protest actions considered as the dependent variable, they found 
that only four of the eight independent variables ("attitudes toward the 
war (.39), year in school (.21), authoritarianism (-.20) and religiosity 
(-.16))" (p. 158) contributed significantly to variations in the depend-
ent variable. Of interest is that I-E control and dogmatism were not 
significantly related to number of protest actions in their analysis. 
Granberg and May conclude that throughout the course of the 
war the beliefs of those involved in social action may have changed from 
a position of internality to one of externality. They speculate that 
internals may be present in the early stages of a reform-oriented move-
ment. The assumption would be that one's efforts would result in posi-
tive reinforcement or achievement of desired goals. They speculate that 
it might be more appropriate to view the I-E control dimension as the 
dependent rather than an independent variable. 
When viewed within the framework of contemporary conceptions 
of courage, the above results are not at all surprising. Regarding I-E 
control as a dependent variable would mean that the nature of the situa-
tion would determine which belief system would be predominant. Contemp-
orary courage has been defined as social action which is based on a 
voluntary acceptance of risk. Implicit in this risk is the notion of 
chance and uncertainty of outcome. On a superficial level, one might 
interpret contemporary courage within the framework of Internal control. 
This would be based on the assumption that new culture adherents believe 
their goals or reinforcements to be directly related to their efforts. 
The reinforcements involved in contemporary courage, however, are 
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long-term in nature. Activists striving for positive social change may 
experience many setbacks and possible negative reinforcements for their 
efforts. The individual striving for the goals of peace and cooperation 
among peoples may indeed begin to perceive that his efforts and his re-
inforcements are unrelated. Such a situation, wherein the realization 
of one's goals are highly uncertain, may call for an External control 
orientation. 
Heilizer and Cutter (1971) Investigated personality correlates 
of risk-taking. Their data indicated that Ss with External beliefs 
"take more extreme risks in chance-determined risk-taking than do low 
I-E Ss - low "externals" or high "internals" (p. 276). In a study in-
vestigating risk-taking in Negro and White adults, Lefcourt (1965) notes 
that Whites behave in an External manner when confronted with a chance 
(gambling) situation. Whites were less cautious, wagered more money on 
less probable bets and showed a preference for lower probability choices 
than Negroes. 
One might speculate that the old culture, which values competi-
tion and skill orientations as well as the ethic of hard work leading to 
eventual success, would foster an I-control approach towards life. Striv-
ing after values of the new culture, however, no longer involves tradi-
tional reinforcements nor socially prescribed modes of obtaining goals. 
Contemporary courage involves leaving the safety of the old culture and 
risking failure by choosing short-term low probability outcomes. In the 
absence of a highly organized and structured new culture, an External 
control orientation, where luck or fate might determine success, seems 
most logical. The civil rights movement, which works within the system 
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proper (Katz, 1967) in striving for concrete success in the form of 
changing laws, and which has in fact seen some advancement in its goals, 
might foster an I-control orientation. 
ACTION CONSISTENT WITH BELIEFS 
A comprehensive explanation of contemporary conceptions of 
courage necessitates an analysis of its behavioural components. The 
response or action implicit in contemporary courage has thus far been 
referred to generally as a form of activism or striving towards goals 
inherent in the new culture. More specifically, involvement in the peace 
movement has provided the context within which the behavioural component 
of contemporary courage has been defined. Action, which completes the 
definition of contemporary courage, may take many varied forms and could 
be applicable to concerns other than peace in the world. Active involve-
ment in community action programs, the civil rights movement or politi-
cal interest groups might also be defined as action components of con-
temporary courage. 
Miller (1970) defined "social activists" as those "spear-
heading movements to implement liberalized social changes" (p. 94). His 
study focused on those arrested while actively protesting the Democratic 
national convention in Chicago, in August 1968. Questionnaire results 
(N = 107) indicated that activists possess social and political orienta-
tions characteristic of the new culture. Ninety-nine percent supported 
the peace movement, 93 percent supported draft resistance, and 83 per-
cent, the New Left. In terms of nonviolence, 48 percent favoured it as 
a universally applicable principle, 23 percent felt they would apply it 
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situationally for themselves, while only 29 percent did not believe in 
nonviolence. The majority of arrested demonstrators (88 percent) were 
charged with nonviolent acts. 
There remains, however, a noticeable reluctance to explain 
activism within the framework of adulthood. Miller states that activism, 
with its unique characteristic of "explicit congruity" (p. 100) can be 
most readily explained by the newly emergent Youth Culture. Also, lack 
of commitment to the adult roles of marriage and career allows for "fewer 
responsibilities and less vulnerability to coercion than the adult, so 
he is freer to take the risks of activism" (p. 101). 
Defining contemporary courage (its behavioural component) 
within the context of a Youth Culture would not only limit its scope, 
but would also render it relatively riskless. Public expression of one's 
beliefs would be safely condoned and tucked away within the boundaries 
of a new and optional stage of psychosocial development. This would 
necessitate defining contemporary courage both temporally and spatially 
within the ranks of high school graduates and college students between 
the ages 18-30. The broader conception of Slater's "new culture" as one 
directly opposed to the old, rather than being merely an optional phase 
in one's development, would seem to allow for a definition of contempor-
ary courage within the adult realm as well. 
Miller states that 75 percent of his sample were "youthful" 
(i.e., between age 18-25). By including high school graduates under age 
18, full-time university students aged 26-30, and "a full-time worker 
with youths (such as a social activist, lawyer, minister or college 
teacher) between ages 26 and 30" (p. 100) he raised his "youthful" 
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sample to 82 percent. Seven percent of his sample, however, also 
listed "social activism" as their career choice. Thus, technically we 
have activists who, through choice of a career, may be defined as adult 
adherents of new culture belief systems. 
Quinley (1970) indicated that active support of the Vietnam 
war is also to be found among Protestant ministers. The "new breed" 
(p. 43) clergymen, neo-orthodox and liberal in religious orientation, 
stress that salvation is achieved by doing good for others. They appear-
ed to possess "an activist social ethic" (p. 46) and were predominantly 
"dovish" in their attitudes towards the Vietnam war. Ministers follow-
ing fundamentalist and conservative schools of religious thought were 
primarily "hawkish" in their attitudes towards the war. 
Results for clergy participation in the Vietnam issue accord-
ing to position on the war (Quinley, 1970) are presented in Table 2. 
Consistent with their attitudes, "new breed" clergymen who favoured com-
plete withdrawal from the war were more likely to express publically 
their views both to the general population and to their parishoners. 
Whereas almost all ministers had discussed the war with their parishoners 
and had delivered a prayer before their congregation centering on the war, 
"doves" were more likely to deliver a sermon on the topic and organize 
study groups as follow-up. Forty-six percent of the most "dovish" minis-
ters had attended a protest meeting as opposed to only 4 percent of the 
most "hawkish" ministers. Of those advocating complete withdrawal, 19 
percent had participated in an anti-war protest march and 7 percent had 
risked arrest in anti-war civil disobedience. 
Further data indicated that all ministers perceive the attitude 
of their parishoners to be more "hawkish" than their own. Negative 
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TABLE 2 
Clergy Participation In The Vietnam Issue According 
To Position On The War 
Clergy par-
ticipation 
Public Involve-
ment 
Made a public 
statement 
(N = 1,504) 
Wrote a public 
official 
(N = 1,499) 
Signed a pe-
tition 
(N - 1,499) 
Church Involve-
ment 
Discussed with 
parishoners 
(N = 1,511) 
Delivered a 
prayer before 
congregation 
(N = 1,504) 
Delivered a 
sermon 
(N = 1,507) 
Organized a 
study group 
(N = 1,505) 
Protest Involve-
ment 
Attended a pro-
test meeting 
(N = 1,512) 
Joined a peace 
organization 
(N = 1,502) 
Participated 
in an anti-war 
protest march 
(N = 1,511) 
Participated in 
anti-war civil 
disoebedience 
(N = 1,508) 
Increase 
Military 
Efforts 
41% 
20 
4 
94 
79 
49 
12 
4 
1 
0 
Position 
Continue 
Bombing 
47% 
19 
8 
97 
84 
60 
27 
11 
5 
1 
0 
on the 
Stop 
Bomb-
ing 
50% 
27 
31 
98 
86 
72 
36 
34 
16 
7 
1 
Vietnam War 
With-
draw 
to En-
claves 
68% 
48 
52 
98 
89 
83 
48 
48 
30 
12 
4 
Comp-
lete 
With-
drawal 
67% 
45 
55 
98 
90 
79 
42 
46 
39 
19 
7 
Total 
Sample 
53% 
30 
27 
97 
85 
66 
30 
25 
16 
8 
2 
Data Table from Quinley, 1970, p. 48. 
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sanctions such as verbal reprisals, loss of parishoners' financial sup-
port, loss of members and attempts to have them removed from their posi-
tions corresponded directly with the "dovishness" of the minister. Of 
note is the fact that the most "dovish" ministers who were also most 
active publically (e.g., risking arrest) generated the most active sup-
port from some of their parishoners. 
A sample of nonstudent demonstrators (N - 91) en route from 
Chicago to the anti-Vietnam war rally held in Washington, D.C., on Octo-
ber 21, 1967 were among those studied by Morse and Peele (1971). Very 
high educational levels (84 percent had attended college, graduate or 
professional school) in combination with varied income levels (a third 
were earning more than $10,000 and a third less than $5,000 in the pre-
vious year) suggests that nonstudent demonstators could be divided into 
two groups. The authors speculate that the low income group may be com-
prised of those who have either dropped out or recently have graduated. 
The higher income group may be older and better established. 
Nonstudents were more radical, politically, than students. 
Seventy-eight percent of nonstudent males as opposed to 70 percent of 
student males stated that they would either leave the country or refuse 
induction rather than serve if drafted. Nonstudents had also partici-
pated in more civil rights and Vietnam activities. Coding these activi-
ties for radicalism indicated that nonstudents again scored higher on 
radicalism. Results also indicate that nonstudents feel significantly 
more alienated from the political system (p. < .001). Although general-
ly possessing a moderate level of optimism for change, nonstudents felt 
significantly less politically efficacious (p. < .025) than did student 
demonstrators. 
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The behavioural component of contemporary courage and the 
social and/or political activism implicit therein, might allow for an 
explanation within the context of national role conceptions. Katz (1967) 
states that one's national roles are latent ones in times of peace. The 
existence of war, whether or not directly declared by the nation, re-
quires that "the individual must either assume his national roles or 
leave the system. And there are no places to go save prison or exile" 
(p. 16). Contemporary conceptions of courage, however, rest on the as-
sumption that, aside from prison or exile, an individual who does not 
wish to assume the role of "soldier" does have an alternativer. 
The new culture, by virtue of its separateness and opposition 
to the established old culture, could be defined as an alternative, 
though loosely organized, "system". If the notion of voluntary and 
active adherence to a new culture system is to carry any validity, then 
some evidence for a changed conception of national role should exist. 
This should, furthermore, correspond closely with the changing values, 
attitudes and belief systems of the new culture. 
Katz states that there has been a relative decline in symbolic 
attachment to national roles. Concomitant with this decline has been a 
rise in normative and functional commitment to national roles. This 
allows for greater freedom of action and could result in cooperative 
rather than military solutions in situations where symbolic attachment 
and the patriotism therein would call for war. These new and more pre-
valent forms of national role involvement, however, are still explained 
within and assume continued adherence to the old culture system. Katz 
merely describes a different attitude individuals may take towards serv-
ing in war. 
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The activism inherent in contemporary conceptions of courage 
could be defined as a functional involvement with a national role con-
ception characteristic of the new culture. The new culture system de-
mands an ideological commitment to its values (e.g., peace). The func-
tional nature of this commitment translates these values, of necessity, 
into specific programs of action. Thus, when viewed in terms of a func-
tional commitment, contemporary conceptions of courage cannot be complete 
without an action component. 
Morse and Peele (1971) define "national role" as "an individ-
ual's conceptualization of his relationship to the political system" 
(p. 115). They state that some individuals, and most likely the majority 
of political activists, are almost continuously conscious of their na-
tional role. They involve themselves with political activities, remain 
informed, and work towards changing policies with which they disagree. 
In contrast, politically passive or apathetic individuals de-emphasize 
the aforementioned traits. They stress "buying savings bonds, being law 
abiding, and volunteering to fight in wars in which the nation is in-
volved" (p. 116). 
The above distinction which is made between politically active 
and passive individuals might be viewed as corresponding with contempor-
ary and traditional conceptions of courage. Thus one might conceive of 
the new culture activist (both political and social) as being more often 
consciously aware of his national role. 
Evidence that activists' conceptions of their national role is 
changing and is no longer as tied to the old system is provided by Morse 
and Peele. Results are presented in Table 3. Although protestors are 
still functional members of the old system in view of their socio-economic 
124 
TABLE 3 
Perceived Necessity Scores Of Activists For Selected 
Components Of National Role 
Role Component Mean S.D. 
Conformity 
be law abiding 2.9 1.9 
always support current policies of government, 
although may work to change them if disagree 
support Supreme Court decisions 
Traditional Patriotism 
be patriotic 
buy U.S. Savings Bonds 
volunteer to fight in war like World War II 
become angry when people criticize U.S. 
Political Participation 
be critical in approach to public issues 
be informed about current events 
work to change policies with which disagree 
be involved in political activities 
Note.-Highest possible item score is 6. indicating that the given 
trait was considered "absolutely necessary". 
Other items on this scale were: volunteer to fight in a war like the 
Korean War, support strikes by labor unions, and refuse to fight in wars 
of any kind. 
N ranges from 371 to 398. 
0.6 
1.8 
1.8 
0 .4 
1.6 
0 .3 
5 .0 
5.0 
5 .4 
4 .2 
1.3 
1.9 
1.9 
1 .1 
2.0 
1.0 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
1.8 
Data Table from Morse and Peele, 1971, p. 125. 
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and educational background, their cognitive commitment to the old 
system indicates otherwise. Table 3 indicates that conformist and 
patriotic national role components are given low priority by these 
activists. Political participation, however, is seen as being of pri-
mary importance. Their conception of the good citizen is one who is 
critical, informed and involved in working for positive change. 
The behavioural component of contemporary courage appears to 
be closely linked with the activist's changed national role conception. 
A comparison group of nonparticipating citizens indicated a greater tend-
ency towards conformity and expression of loyalty in traditional symbol-
ic ways. They were more accepting of demand such as serving in the 
armed forces, which government could make. Stressed by activists was 
the individual's right to refuse such demands. 
TABLE 4 
Protestors' Scores On Functional-Internal Scale Items 
Item Mean S.D. 
Concern for Government 
The war is undermining many American's faith 
in their government. 3.0 2.2 
A great deal of conflict is being generated 
within the U.S. 1.4 1.8 
Concern for People 
The resources used to fight the war are more 
urgently needed at home. 5.1 1.5 
American boys are being killed for nothing. 5.4 1.2 
Note.-Highest possible item score is 6. Zero indicated "not important 
reason" for opposition, 6 indicated "extremely important reason". 
Data Table from Morse and Peele, 1971, p. 123. 
126 
Table 4 shows that activists' concerns are also more directed 
towards general human interests. They view themselves as being "citizens 
of the world" (p. 124) and are not as oriented towards a specific na-
tional system. 
Morse and Peele also provide data which suggests that the re-
fusal of activists to participate in war is predicated both on interna-
tionalistic and moral concerns. Answers to questions measuring an inter-
nationalistic versus a nationalistic orientation showed a definite skew-
ing towards the internationalism pole. They found that "slightly more 
than a quarter of the sample (N = 410) (was) at the 80 (percent) or above 
mark" (p. 122). Opposition to the war because it "is offensive for 
moral reasons" (p. 123) was rated highest over other functional national 
or world concerns as shown in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
Protestors' Scores On Opposition To War Scales 
Scale Mean S.D. 
Functional-Internal 
Functional-External 
Functional-World 
Moral 
Note.-Highest possible scale score is 100; N ranges from 391 to 399. 
Data Table from Morse and Peele, 1971, p. 123. 
In view of the strong leaning towards a general and largely 
moral concern for the peoples of the world expressed by activists, it 
might be appropriate to define contemporary courage within an interna-
tional as opposed to a national role context. The common and most sali-
ent feature would be the voluntary decision to accept the risk inherent 
57 18.5 
41 24.8 
84 19.2 
92 14.7 
127 
in social and/or political activism in an effort to advance new culture 
belief systems. Subsumed under such a definition would be the active, 
yet nonviolent resistance or "satyagraha" preached by Ghandi (Feuerlicht, 
1965) , decisions to resist the draft and accept penitentiary sentences 
by Americans (e.g., Osborne, 1971), or the social activism of Canadian 
Dr. Henry Morgentaler in his efforts to legalize abortion (Weekend Maga-
zine, 1974). 
Stage 6 of Kohlberg's moral development conceptualization 
would appear relevant. This stage of moral development, found at the 
postconventional, autonomous or principled level, concerns itself with 
universal ethical orientations. Within this stage: 
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with 
self-chosen ethical principles, appealing to logical compre-
hensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles 
are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical 
imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten 
Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of 
justice, of the reciprocity and equality of the human rights, 
and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual 
persons, (in Holme, p. 307) 
New culture activists who strive towards change and oppose the authori-
tarian dictates of the old culture might be exemplars of Stage 6. Tradi-
tional conceptions of courage might be explained within the conventional 
level of Kohlberg's moral development schemata. The "law and order" 
orientation (in Holme, p. 307) of Stage 4 with its emphasis on fixed 
rules and respect for authority appears to characterize nonactivist or 
more conforming members of the old culture. 
Studies which examine draft-resistance, and more specifically, 
the variable of signing versus not signing an antidraft pledge (their 
criterion measure of actions consistent with attitudes) provide data 
which appears to support the definition of contemporary courage developed 
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in the present paper. An antidraft petition called the "We-Won't-Go" 
pledge was the criterion measure employed by Janis and Rausch (1970). 
They found that only a small minority, 2 percent, of the students sur-
veyed (N = 200) had already signed the pledge. Those who were consider-
ing taking such action comprised 25 percent of their sample. Names of 
the signers and the text of the pledge was regularly published in the 
local newspaper. Thus, signers were aware of the strong personal com-
mitment they were accepting in addition to the serious personal conse-
quences (i.e., 5 years in prison and a $10,000. fine) they were risking. 
In spite of admitted feelings of "considerable conflict, 
anxiety and uncertainty about their decision" (p. 53) 12 of the 62 Ss 
in the study chose to act publically in a manner consistent with their 
beliefs. Furthermore, when questioned as to their willingness to partici-
pate in other protest actions the authors found a strong significant 
positive linear relationship (p. < .01) between Ss stand on the anti-
draft pledge and their willingness to engage in other protest actions. 
This suggests that activism and engagement in a life-style which demands 
striving for positive change is not restricted to one specific and isola-
ted event. 
Pro and antidraft articles were also presented for Ss to read. 
A significant main effect for type of article showed higher interests for 
propledge articles for all Ss. A significant interaction effect between 
type of article and signers versus nonsigners was also found. Interest 
ratings did not differ for the propledge articles. For the antipledge 
articles, however, those opposed to signing the pledge expressed signi-
ficantly less interest in reading the articles. These results are the 
reverse of what would be predicted by the selective avoidance hypothesis. 
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The minority who act in a manner consistent with their beliefs 
appear more ready to expose themselves to information relevant not only 
for but also against their position. Among the explanations provided by 
Janis and Rausch is the possibility that "some important predispositional 
attribute-such as a personality or ideological variable that makes for 
marked differences in open-mindedness- might be the underlying determin-
ant both of attitudes toward the We-Won't-Go pledge and readiness to 
expose oneself to the pro or anti communications" (p. 53). 
Cowdry, Keniston and Cabin (1970) defined consistency in their 
study as "taking public action on one's private antiwar attitudes by 
signing the MSR (Military Service Resolution)" (p. 522). Their main com-
parison group was between groups with equally strong antiwar attitudes 
who either did or did not sign the MSR. They designated these groups as 
"signers" and "antiwar nonsigners" respectively. 
With regards to social change, signers indicated a stronger 
personal commitment to social action which they hoped would improve Ameri-
can society. Antiwar nonsigners, moderates and pros showed only a mod-
erate commitment to social change. Signers were also more likely than 
antiwar nonsigners to favour action outside the established social chan-
nels in order to effect change. The authors also found signers to be 
"the most active group in all spheres of political activity-not only in 
protest activity...but also in constructivist and traditional activity" 
(p. 539). With regards to draft induction, significantly more signers 
planned to refuse induction. 
In contrast to the sociopolitical activities of signers, 
moderates and pros showed a significant preference for conformist acti-
vities such as being in good standing at Yale and dressing in the "Yale 
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manner". Future professional plans of signers also indicate less rigid 
ties to the old culture and its institutions. A significantly greater 
proportion planned to enter the teaching profession as opposed to the 
legal, professional and political choices of antiwar nonsigners. 
Keniston's 13 alienation scales were also administered to all 
Ss in the above study. Results indicated that with the exception of 
cultural alienation, all the remaining scales failed to distinguish sig-
nificantly between the groups. Cowdry, Keniston and Cabin conclude: 
Today's student activists are not alienated in a general 
way from their fellows, from group involvement, and so on. 
The high observed correlation between antiwar attitudes 
and 'cultural alienation' points instead to a more focal 
rejection of the existing institutions, policies and va-
lues of American society...activists are alientated from 
present American culture, (p. 545) 
The above findings, in conjunction with evidence suggesting 
that not only students but adults are also actively involved in socio-
political activities in an effort to change existing policies, adds some 
validity to the existence of a new culture and the contemporary concep-
tion of courage explained therein. 
CONCLUSION 
An exploratory attempt has been made, in the present thesis, 
to obtain a more precise and hopefully scientifically useful operational 
definition of the concept "courage". Such a task has been very descrip-
tively and perhaps aptly referred to as that of "opening a can of worms". 
Initially, such a conglomeration of definitions was uncovered that courage 
seemed, at least superficially, to have lost all meaningfulness and 
definitiveness. 
The primary contribution of this thesis has been to isolate the 
existence of not one but two major and radically different conceptions of 
courage. These have been termed "Traditional" and "Contemporary" by this 
author primarily for the purpose of clarity and distinction. Employing 
the term "traditional" for one conception of courage was not to connote 
that it was perhaps outdated or obsolete in modern society. Traditional 
courage was, in fact, found to abound contemporaneously. 
Historically and in present times, traditional courage remains 
a symbol of physical strength and prowess, as well as moral fortitude and 
perseverance. The highly deterministic nature of traditional courage 
suggested that conformity theories may serve as an appropriate explanatory 
framework. Very evident was the notion that one earned the title or label 
of "courage" through performance of various and almost ritualistic social-
ly prescribed deeds (e.g. valour in battle, honour in sports, perseverance 
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in hardships). 
The highly subjective nature of the many definitions uncovered 
and their quasi-philosophical basis made analysis on a psychological 
level (i.e., operational definition) rather difficult. Physical courage 
it was concluded could most appropriately be examined within a behavioural 
context as a socially prescribed response to a specified stimulus. The 
physical courage attributed, for example, to saving a drowning child, 
suggested also that Altruism may be a potential research framework for 
traditional courage. Moral courage was found always to be more highly 
valued than physical courage. This author concluded that moral courage 
might be researched as an attitude (e.g. optimism in the face of tragedy, 
perseverance and patience in the face of prejudice). 
The conception of a new definition of courage seemed to evolve 
with the emergence of the "new culture" (Slater, 1971), a genuine Peace 
Movement (Kincaid and Kincaid, 1971) and the acknowledgement of Youth as 
a separate stage of psychosocial development (Keniston, in Holme, 1971). 
These factors were examined in this thesis primarily as stimuli serving 
to precipitate the need for a new and changed conception of courage. The 
basic tenets of contemporary courage were found to be in direct contrast 
to traditional conceptions. Relative freedom of response and personal 
involvement of the individual, both on a cognitive (risk-taking, rational 
decision-making) and affective (commitment, changing attitudes) level, 
replaced the deterministic, non-personally oriented emphasis of tradi-
tional courage. Primary emphasis in contemporary courage is no longer on 
coping with stress in a socially-prescribed fashion in order to merit 
being called "courageous" or "a man". Rather, action towards positive 
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change based on a freely chosen cognitive commitment to risk becomes of 
primary importance. 
Contemporary courage has in this thesis been discussed within 
the framework of a Peace Movement. This, however, must be viewed merely 
as a frame of reference for isolating possible viable definitional com-
ponents and providing theoretical support for contemporary courage. 
Studies of activists (e.g., Morse and Peele, 1971) suggested that their 
concerns were not limited to one specific realm but were fairly wide-
spread. Any form of social and/or political activism which is directed 
towards positive and constructive change as opposed to merely voicing 
privately one's negative opinions (Jones, 1970) was defined in this thesis 
as characteristic of contemporary courage. A definite commitment placed 
the courageous action within the Adult realm of experience (in Holme, 
1971). Emphasis on moral concerns for humanity and an internationallstic 
role conception (Morse and Peele, 1971) appeared to support the new cul-
ture allegiance of contemporary courage. 
The present thesis and the definitional components of contemp-
orary courage outlined therein remain purely theoretical in nature. 
Further research is required both to empirically assess this author's 
contentions and hopefully to substantiate and enlarge upon the basic 
speculations proposed. A new dimension could in the process be added 
both to risk-taking theories and activism research. 
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